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RESTRAINT OF NEW ENTERPRISE JOINT VENTURES
AS A MATTER OF UNREASONABLE PROBABILITY
by
Frank L. McClendon, Jr. *
OINT ventures, as a form of business association for sharing risks and
profits, have long been known to commerce' but only recently given a
distinctive recognition in law.' In terms of economic impact the phenome-
non is even more recent. Use of joint ventures as a business device has in-
creased from a small base to enormous proportions in the post-World
War II era. Use of the device as a convenient means to provide the great
concentrations of economic resources, knowledge, and skill necessary to
meet many modern day business situations has led to this rise to promi-
nence and wide utilization.'
The many combinations that may be involved in joint activity," and
the many applications thereof, have led inevitably to antitrust scrutiny.
Recent governmental attacks on the joint venture as a legal entity within
the purview of antitrust laws have stimulated much controversy and
speculation.' Although the courts now have provided some guidance,
commentators are divided as to the proper approach which should be
adopted in evaluating the antitrust legality of joint venture relationships.
The purpose of this Article is to analyze the impact of antitrust laws, es-
pecially the Sherman Act' and section 7 of the Clayton Act,7 on corporate
new business joint activity and to offer suggestions for coping with the
problems presented.8
* B.S., University of Texas; LL.B., University of Texas; LL.M., Southern Methodist University.
Attorney at Law, Los Angeles, California.
1S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 318-318C (3d ed. 1959).
"The concept of joint adventure as a legal relationship or association sui generis is purely
of American origin dating from about 1890. Just how or why it originated no one seems precisely
to know." State ex rel. Crane Co. v. Stokke, 65 S.D. 207, 272 N.W. 811, 817 (1937).
STractenberg, Joint Ventures on the Domestic Front: A Study in Uncertainty, 8 ANTITRUST
BULL. 797 (1963).
"'Examples of parties associating themselves in joint ventures, in addition to individual per-
sons, include syndicates and partnerships, partnerships and partnerships, individual persons and
partnerships, individual persons and corporations, corporations with other corporations, cor-
porations with joint ventures and corporations with partnerships, limited or otherwise." S. WIL-
LISTON, supra note 1, § 318C, at 620-21.
' "The current interest of the Antitrust Division in joint ventures well illustrates the ambiva-
lent and constantly changing emphasis of antitrust enforcement policy." Gesell, Joint Ventures in
the Light of Recent Antitrust Developments: Joint Ventures and the Prosecutor, 10 ANTITRUST
BULL. 31 (1965).
6Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964).
715 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), formerly 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
'Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1964), will be ex-
cluded from consideration herein. It must be noted, however, that in the future the Commission
may seek to further augment its all-encompassing banner of "unfair methods of competition in
commerce," and lay siege on joint ventures. This has been strongly hinted by Chairman Dixon,
who stated: "To function effectively the Commission must do more than merely challenge old
practices. It must also observe and evaluate new ones which may be developing so that, if neces-
sary, prompt action may be taken against them. These new practices may include some old ones
which sometimes reappear in their original guise but often in a somewhat different one, as is now
the case with respect to joint ventures."
Chairman Dixon's speech singled out "vast corporate estates" of joint ventures in the glass,
chemical, petro-chemical and steel industries which mostly involved actual competitors in the same
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I. THE JOINT VENTURE CONCEPT
Definitional Problems. Basic to a meaningful discussion is the problem of
delineating those types of joint business activities which are more likely
to be sensitive to antitrust challenges. The most significant problems have
emerged when two or more corporations associate for a business purpose.
The combination activities may include simple agreements for joint re-
search, resource development, bidding, buying, or selling, or may involve
more sophisticated agreements creating a joint subsidiary. Of the two de-
grees of joint corporate activity, the jointly owned and incorporated sub-
sidiary currently presents the greater challenge and will be exclusively
dealt with herein. With respect to joint subsidiaries, the emphasis herein
shall be directed toward those associations formed to create "new busi-
ness" activity. Thus, a joint venture9 for our purposes is defined as an
association between corporate entities for pooling of resources and skills
through incorporation of a joint subsidiary to conduct a new business en-
terprise. This definition excludes joint involvement through merger or
consolidation, exchange of stock, and acquisition of stock or assets in an
established corporation."0
Creation of a joint subsidiary establishes varying identifiable relation-
ships between the venture and the parent companies. Joint ventures have
been classified as horizontal, vertical, conglomerate, or a combination
thereof. An understanding of the differences in these relationships is help-
ful in analyzing the major problems to be discussed, including anticom-
petitive effects, analogy to mergers, and potential competition.
A "horizontal joint venture" results when two or more actual or poten-
tial competitors create a new enterprise to produce or sell the same pro-
duct as the parents produce or sell, but in a different geographical market.
The parents thus form the horizontal venture to exploit a new or third
geographical area where neither presently participates.'
lines of commerce many of which "were integral parts of a world-wide cartel." Contrasting these
multi-headed giants "decked out in the garb of a joint venture," recognition was given to the
necessity in some cases for small, individually insignificant, companies to band together through
joint arrangements to meet certain competitive situations. Between these two extremes lies the
Penn-Olin case, which is worthy of considerable discussion. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co.,
217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963), remanded, 378 U.S. 158 (1964), 246 F. Supp. 917 (D. Del.
1965), aff'd without opinion, 389 U.S. 308 (1967). Of particular interest is the divergence of
approaches found in the Dixon speech and by the Department of Justice when contrasted with
that of the District Court in its exhaustive treatment of the record. Dixon, Joint Ventures: What
is Their Impact on Competition?, 7 ANTITRUST BULL. 397 (1962).
'The terms joint venture, joint subsidiary, and corporate joint venture will be used inter-
changeably herein unless otherwise distinguished.
"°The stock of a corporate joint venture is wholly owned by two or more other corporations.
It is to be distinguished from wholly-owned subsidiaries, and the term is not usually applied to
a company which is partially owned by other corporations and partially owned by the public.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), does not reach a joint association composed
of individuals. See Backman, Joint Ventures and the Antitrust Laws, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 651
(1965); Berghoff, Antitrust Aspects of Joint Ventures, 9 ANTITRUST BULL. 231 (1964); Hale,
Joint Ventures: Collaborative Subsidiaries and the Antitrust Laws, 42 VA. L. REv. 927 (1956);
cf. Nichols, Joint Ventures, 36 VA. L. REv. 425 (1950).
" A joint venture formed to produce or sell a product that both parents produce or sell in an
area of existing competition between the parents, while technically creating a new entity and new
competitive force, is so similar to a horizontal merger with foreclosure of actual competition, that
it cannot be considered a "new business" joint venture.
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A "vertical joint venture" operates at a different functional level than
that of the parents. The "backward vertical venture" establishes a new
entity which acts as a source of supply for the parent corporations which
typically will be competitors in their product market. The "forward ver-
tical venture" creates a new entity which will become a customer of the
parent corporations, typically buying exclusively from them." The rela-
tionship of the parents may be competitive or non-competitive depending
on the nature of their separate existences.
The "conglomerate venture" occurs when two or more corporations
create a new entity to engage in an enterprise entirely different from those
previously engaged in by the respective parents. It is distinguished from
vertical and horizontal ventures in that this entity is neither customer,
supplier, nor competitor of any participating parent.
A "mixed" joint subsidiary is a combination of the above relationships;
the variations are too numerous to list. The many possible combinations
serve to point up the dubious value of labeling and broad generalizations
with respect to joint ventures, unless the class of relationships and factual
background is clearly understood.1'
joint Ventures and Merger Rationale. Any discussion of applicability of
antitrust laws to joint ventures suggests an inquiry into the established
judicial precedents found in merger situations. Both mergers and joint
ventures are the result of two distinct business entities joining together in
a common business endeavor. The distinctive feature of a joint venture is
the creation of a new productive organization with the parents' identities
left intact. Mergers eliminate the corporate existence of one or more of
the parents."
Elimination of the corporate existence of one of the parents through
merger may or may not reduce the number of competitors in a particular
geographic or product market. A horizontal merger reduces the number
of competitors by one or more, while vertical and conglomerate mergers
tend to leave the number unchanged. A new business joint venture always
increases the number of actual"a competitors in a field and tends to in-
" Texas-U.S. Rubber Chemical Company provides an example of a venture that occupies a
forward vertical position with one parent and a backward vertical relation with the other. It
manufactures synthetic rubber with some raw material requirements from Texas Company (now
Texaco, Inc.) and sells its output to U.S. Rubber Company. The venture is thus a customer to
one parent and an assured source of supply to the other. The facilities were purchased from the
United States Government with direct involvement by Congress and the Department of Justice.
See Boyle, The Joint Subsidiary: An Economic Appraisal, 5 ANTITRUST BULL. 303, 310-11 (1960).
See also Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940). For discussion of disposal
of Government-owned synthetic rubber facilities to joint venturers, see Comment, Joint Sub-
sidiaries and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 39 DET. L.J. 223, 230-35 (1961).
"1 See Tractenberg, supra note 3; Comment, The Corporate Joint Venture Under the Antitrust
Laws, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 712 (1962); Comment, Corporate Joint Ventures and Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 9 VILL. L. REV. 94 (1963).
"'In a merger, two or more companies combine all of their assets to create a new entity. In
a joint venture, two or more companies combine less than all of their assets to create a new en-
tity." Bernstein, Joint Ventures in the Light of Recent Antitrust Developments: Anti-Competitive
Joint. Ventures, 10 ANTITRUST BULL. 25 (1965).
" While joint ventures increase the number of actual competitors, they may decrease the num-
ber of potential competitors by one or more. This will be discussed fully in a separate section,
infra, notes 117-25, and accompanying text.
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crease the number of customers available to suppliers and the number of
outlets available to consumers."t A merger often reduces the number of
customers available to suppliers and the number of choices available to
consumers.
While analogy to horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate mergers is both
useful and inevitable, such an analysis should not lose sight of the fact
that a new business joint venture creates a new entity, while mergers ex-
tinguish an entity. Understanding the ramifications of this distinction is
essential in making the ultimate determination-effect on competition.
Joint Ventures: Economic Motive vs. Anticompetitive Effect. The eco-
nomic advantages accruing to parents of a joint enterprise are easily
stated and have contributed substantially to the popularity of this form
of doing business. They are to (1) provide the large amounts of capital
needed for development of raw materials and natural resources, (2) in-
crease chances of success of a technological innovation with uncertain
prospects and considerable capital requirements, (3) establish one large
facility in the production or marketing chain which is more economical
and efficient in operation than smaller, separate installations, and (4) un-
dertake research projects on a scale too vast for single companies.
Perhaps the strongest motivation prompting our society to change from
one dependent upon sole proprietorships to one dependent upon business
associations was the desire of individuals to band together to increase
their ability to raise capital and share unusual risks. As corporations have
become more sophisticated, merger waves have periodically swept the
country, prompted in many cases by the additional advantages of comple-
mentary use of research and marketing techniques and by economies of
vertical integration. These same basic economic advantages today moti-
vate corporations large and small-whether consummated in joint sub-
sidiary form or not-to join together.
The many compelling and laudable reasons for creating joint ventures
are not sufficient in and of themselves to justify venture creation in
many cases. The real antitrust problems center around what has been
characterized as the power motive-the desire to lessen or avoid compe-
tition-and those situations where the necessary or probable result will be
a substantial lessening of competition.' Preoccupation with classifying
labels (horizontal, vertical, conglomerate or mixed) is not likely to be
fruitful in making these determinations. Anticompetitive effects and pub-
lic injury should be assayed only after a thorough examination of a ven-
ture in its particular setting, as will be later demonstrated.
","It is evident, therefore, that the formation of a joint venture in terms of numbers must,
in the first instance, add a new dimension to competition and the size of the market." Backman,
Joint Ventures in the Light of Recent Antitrust Developments: Joint Ventures in the Chemical
Industry, 10 ANTITRUST BULL. 7, 9 (1965).
17Berghoff, supra note 10, at 233; Boyle, suPra note 12, at 307; Handler, Emerging Antitrust
Issues: Reciprocity, Diversification and Joint Ventures, 49 V^. L. REv. 433, 442 (1963); Tracten-
berg, supra note 3, at 805; Comment, The Joint Venture Meets Section 7 of the Clayton Act:
Technical Capability, Reasonable Probability and Business Reality, 38 S. CAL. L. Ruv. 104, 108(1965).
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In addition to the criticism of joint ventures as a mere convenience
device to avoid the rigors of independent competition by the parents,
other possible anti-competitive effects have been stated. One is that price,
production, and other decisions of the parents-for themselves and their
progeny-may be so interrelated that the results will be altered substan-
tially and will affect adversely competition in a manner which would not
occur if the venture were independent of the parents. This risk is most
likely to occur when the venture produces the same goods as its parents. 8
The charge has been made that acting as a joint venture at one level-
for example, manufacturing or mining-may well lead to collateral re-
strictive behavior at another level, such as retailing or in another line of
commerce. The fear is that when actual or potential competitors are af-
forded a common meeting ground to discuss venture matters, a myriad
of collaborative practices, such as reduction in competition between the
parents' independent facilities or restrictive elimination of competition
between the parents and the venture, may result."'
Other criticisms include the assertions that entry by way of joint ven-
ture into a line of commerce will raise entry barriers for small corpora-
tions, that a leading potential competitor may be eliminated by absorption
into a joint venture, and that substantial power possessed by one or more
of the parents in one market may be used to create similar and stifling
power in the venture market.'
II. JOINT VENTURES AND THE SHERMAN ACT
Basic Prohibitions. While there is no inherent illegality in engaging in joint
ventures, there is no question that they are and should be subject to sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act." The purpose of the Sherman Act is
"to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopo-
lies."" Section 1 prohibits contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in
restraint of trade." Section 2 declares it unlawful for any person to monop-
olize trade, attempt to monopolize trade, or combine or conspire to mo-
S C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 138 (1959). "One of the anticompetitive
dangers of joinder inheres in the fact that the creation of a venture by two previously independent
corporations results in a triumvirate of associated corporations." Note, Applicability of Section 7
to a joint Venture, 11 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 393, 396 (1964).
"United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 963 (D. Mass. 1950);
Comment, suspra note 17, at 108.
"See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra
note 18, at 138; Bernstein, supra note 14; Dixon, supra note 8.
2United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); Timken Roller Bearing Co.
v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131
(1948); United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947); Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912); United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); United States v. Pan Am. World Airways,
Inc., 193 F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), remanded on other grounds, 371 U.S. 296 (1963); United
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd on other grounds,
351 U.S. 377 (1956); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y.
1951); see dictum in United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F., Supp. 947, 963 (D.
Mass. 1950).
"Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1 (1964).
""'Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal:"
15 U.S.C. S 1 (1964).
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nopolize trade.' However, no definitions of specific misconduct can be
found in the Act. 5 This lack of preciseness makes it incumbent on the
judiciary to give the Sherman Act meaning to the business community.
Tests of Legality. The Sherman Act does not contain a reasonableness
standard, and early cases rejected such a standard, holding that no excep-
tion or limitation could be adduced without writing into the Act what
Congress had omitted." The Supreme Court in 1911, however, in the
leading case of Standard Oil of New Jersey v. United States"7 carefully
examined the history and philosophy behind enactment of the Sherman
Act, and concluded that only those agreements and combinations which
prejudice public interest by unduly restricting competition or unduly
obstructing the due course of trade are embraced by it."s
As a result of extended judicial experience with the Sherman Act, cer-
tain agreements and practices which have a "pernicious effect on com-
petition and lack of any redeeming virtue"" are now presumed unreason-
able without elaborate inquiry into factual circumstances or economic data.
Per se unreasonable categories include price fixing,"* division of markets, 1
group boycotts,"2 and product tying arrangements.
Application of the "rule of reason" prevails in joint venture cases, as
it is clear that the mere fact of joint venturing does not give rise to a per
se violation of the Act."4 It does not follow, however, that joint ventures
' "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. ... 15 U.S.C.
S2, at 336 (1964).2
'Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911): "In view of the many new
forms of contracts and combinations which were being evolved from existing economic condi-
tions, it was deemed essential by an all-embracing enumeration to make sure no form of contract
or combination by which an undue restraint of interstate or foreign commerce was brought about
could save such restraint from condemnation." See Handler, The Judicial Architects of the Rule
of Reason, 10 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 21 (1957).
" United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
27221 U.S. 1 (1911).
" The Act "being broad enough to embrace every conceivable contract or combination which
could be made concerning trade or commerce . . . [and cause] any act done . . . in the whole
field of human activity to be illegal if in restraint of trade, it inevitably follows that . . . [it
calls] for the exercise of judgment . . . . Thus not specifying but indubitably contemplating
and requiring a standard, it follows that it was intended that the standard of reason . . . was
intended to be the measure used" in determining violations of the Act. Id. at 60; Thomsen v.
Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 84 (1917); see Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price
Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966); Montague, "Per se Illegality" and the
Rule of Reason, 12 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 69 (1958).
" "This principle . . . avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged eco-
nomic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries,
in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable-an inquiry
so often wholly fruitless when undertaken." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1958); See generally Van Cise, The Future of Per Se in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. Rv. 1165
(1964).
SoUnited States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
31 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S.
211 (1899).
3 Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
3: International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
"'United States v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 18, 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1961);
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 219-20 (D. Del. 1953),
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formed for the purposes or having the effects prohibited in the per se un-
reasonable classifications would escape judicial wrath. The vital distinc-
tion between per se situations and new business joint ventures is that the
latter create a new competitive force, and thus are entitled to closest scru-
tiny before being found unreasonable. A substantial majority of writers
in the field support the "rule of reason" approach to joint ventures."s
Applicability to Joint Ventures. In applying the reasonableness standard
to specific cases, the courts have found it necessary to inquire whether a
given restraint "merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competi-
tion or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. '
It is necessary to consider the actual or probable nature of the restraint,
the particular factual setting to which it is applied, the business conditions
before and after it was imposed, and the purpose or result sought to be
attained. The factors relevant in determining the reasonableness of one
venture may or may not be relevant in examining another venture."
The district court decision in United States v. Pan American Airways, "'
involving an admitted division of territories among the venture parents,
provides a strong example of Sherman Act sufficiency and vitality in test-
ing new business joint ventures and the inappropriateness of per se classi-
fications with respect to them. In 1929, Pan American World Airways and
W.R. Grace & Company formed a jointly owned subsidiary, Pan Ameri-
can-Grace Airways (Panagra) for the purpose of operating an airline
along the west coast of South America. The complaint, filed some thirty
years later, charged unlawful conspiracy in restraint of trade and division
of markets in the transportation of passengers, cargo, and mail between
the United States and South America both from the standpoint of reason-
ableness and as a per se violation of section 1, and charged an attempt to
monopolize such transportation in violation of section 2.
In 1927, international commercial aviation was in the experimental
stage; no American air transportation was in operation between the United
States and South America and substantially all transportation was by
steamship. Late in 1927, Pan American began to formulate plans to enter
the South American market, but its ambitions were not equalled by its
aff'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504, 557
(S.D.N.Y. 1951).
35K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 206 (1958); W. FUGATE,
FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 257 (1958); REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
NATIONAL COMMITTEE To STUDY ANTITRUST LAWS 90 (1955); Boyle, supra note 12, at 310;
Friedmann, Antitrust Law and joint International Business Ventures in Economically Underdevel-
oped Countries, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 780, 790 (1960); Tractenberg, supra note 3, at 804; Com-
ment, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 13, at 714. But see Graham, Antitrust Problems of Corporate
Parents, Subsidiaries, Affiliates and joint Ventures in Foreign Commerce, 9 A.B.A. SECTION O
ANTITRUST L. PROC. 32, 38 (1956).
N "To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the
business to which the restraint is applied; . . . the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual
or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts." .Board of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
" Id.; Jewel Tea Co. v. Local Unions, 274 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 1960); United States v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 137 F. Supp. 78 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
38 193 F. Supp. IS (S.D.N.Y. 1961 ).
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assets and financial resources. In early 1928, Grace independently began
inquiry into the feasibility of establishing an airline to the west coast of
South America, the only area where its steamships faced air competition
at that time. The key to successful maintenance of an American airline
in South America was a United States postal contract, without which any
company would suffer heavy losses. With bids on postal contracts pend-
ing, Grace and Pan American held meetings in 1928 which culminated in
formation of Panagra. Their joinder, with their complementary resources,
was of decisive importance in awarding the postal contract to Panagra.
From the outset, each parent fully appreciated the dangers of competi-
tion between themselves for the mail contract, and Grace was concerned
particularly about the potential competition of air transportation with its
large steamship investments. Each parent, while in a strong bargaining
position, needed the attributes of the other for the successful operation of
the airline, and each feared the consequences of the other's opposition."
After reviewing all of the evidence, the court concluded that forma-
tion of Panagra did not constitute a conspiracy in restraint of trade:
The joinder of Grace and Pan American of their complementary facilities
was a natural and mutually advantageous combination, and an economically
sound arrangement for the establishment and successful development of
American commercial aviation on the west coast of South America .... The
union of their physical and technical resources assured the maximum possi-
bilities of success in instituting and carrying on a pioneering venture, useful
to the community which did not theretofore exist.'
With the purpose of the combination found legitimate, the court pointed
out that "differences of opinion as to the growth and development of
their jointly owned company does not . . . operate to make their joinder
or combination, in limine, one in restraint of trade, or their combination
presently, qua combination, one in restraint of trade."
The crux of the suit revolved around Grace's nominees' attempts to
broaden the venture scope of operation after it began to prosper. Begin-
ning in 1938, the Grace nominees sought to extend Panagra's routes, for-
merly confined strictly to South America, to the United States in compe-
tition with Pan American. Pan American, by reason of its fifty per cent
stock ownership in Panagra, negatively blocked the competition; this
veto ultimately led to suit being filed.
A very important aspect of the case was the court's demonstration
of applicability of section 2 to joint ventures, and appropriate remedies
a By joining with each other in a joint venture on the west coast, Grace on the one
hand would be assured against the entry of an -independent American airline com-
petitor in its west coast domain, and gain time to acquire the experience and know-
how of this new industry .... Pan American on the other hand would be sub-
stantially free from American flag competition in the rest of Latin America. Their
method of organization of the joint company appears calculated to give each negative
control of the company to insure against the possible treachery of the other to
expand the operations of the company in competition with their respective inde-
pendent lines. . . .
Id. at 31.4 0 Id. at 32-33.
4t Id. at 3S.
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thereunder. The court assumed, as pointed out above, that Pan American
came by its virtual monopoly position legally, but found that Pan Amer-
ican's use of its position to frustrate Panagra's entry into the market
contravened section 2 of the Sherman Act. Thus Pan American was or-
dered to show cause why it should not be divested of its interest in Pa-
nagra.
The court further noted (1) that Pan American's justification for
blocking the venture's efforts was based on fallacious predicate since
Panagra was not part of the Pan American system, and (2) that the ven-
ture's abstention from independent entry was not the result of concerted
action. Demonstrating a proper understanding of the "rule of reason" ap-
proach to joint venture cases, the court stated: "We would like it clearly
understood that it is not our opinion that every defendant who exercises
similar negative control over a single potential competitor and thereby
excludes such competitor from a relevant market necessarily monopolizes
thereby. It is a relative concept which can only be applied in a given
context.'"'
4
By reason of the conceded division of markets, the Government was not
content to confine its efforts to the restraining parent, and charged that
the mere ownership or control by a steamship company of an airline
company operating a parallel route constitutes a per se violation of sec-
tion 1. In commenting on the Government's citations of authority "where
the obvious purpose was to eliminate competition, ' the court made the
proper distinction vital to new business ventures: "It is apparent that the
principle upon which these cases were decided applied to combinations of
existing companies which were in substantial competition with one another
prior to their combination,""' and properly concluded that Grace's own-
ership of Panagra did not have such a "pernicious effect on competition
and lack of any redeeming virtue" that it constituted per se unreasonable
restraint on trade and commerce.
It is most unfortunate that on appeal to the Supreme Court," the
excellent analysis and holdings of the district court were muddied by the
higher court's involvement with "primary jurisdiction" of the Civil Aero-
nautics Board, which did not reach the merits of the antitrust issues. The
district court's decision remains, however, a compelling testament to the
complete sufficiency of Sherman Act concepts and remedies in dealing
with new business joint ventures. Furthermore, that decision should be
understood to have application to venture problems from inception through
abuse, and not be categorized as a mere "pioneering venture" case.
Another case which applied the "rule of reason" approach to joint ven-
tures was United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries," where the court
found the major purpose of agreements between the parents for formation
of joint manufacturing subsidiaries with exchange of patents and pro-
"Id. at 41 (emphasis added).
4"Id. at 48.
"Id. (emphasis added).
41United States v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
46 United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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cesses was for division of world markets and avoidance of competition
in the manufacture of explosives. The proof showed that the American
parent, which was already established in a foreign market, and the Brit-
ish parent, which had a foothold in the same market, combined for the
purpose of developing the market to their mutual benefit with profits di-
vided on an agreed basis. These agreements were found unreasonable in
violation of section 1, but the court stated: "It is settled that joint manu-
facturing ventures, even in domestic markets, are not made unlawful per
se by the Sherman Act, but become unlawful only if their purpose or
their effect is to restrain trade or to monopolize."47
Although the district court went overboard with gratuitous dictum,
United States v. Minnesota Mining &q Manufacturing Co." further illus-
trates how the Sherman Act is more than adequate to control abuses under
a joint venture arrangement. For reasons of market protection, American
manufacturers controlling four-fifths of the export trade in coated abra-
sives agreed not to compete in areas supplied by their jointly owned for-
eign subsidiaries. The restraint was not the mere formation of the joint
subsidiaries, but the agreement not to compete with them when it was
legally, politically, and economically possible to do so. In a statement that
must be considered in context, the court conjectured that:
It may very well be that even though there is an economic or political barrier
which entirely precludes American exports to a foreign country a combi-
nation of dominant American manufacturers to establish joint factories for
the sole purpose of serving the internal commerce of that country is a per se
violation . . .of the Sherman Act. The intimate association of the principal
American producers in day-to-day manufacturing operations, their exchange
of patent licenses and industrial know-how, and their common experience
in marketing and fixing prices may inevitably reduce their zeal for compe-
tition inter sese in the American market.49
Keeping in mind that the court was dealing with a combination con-
trolling eighty per cent of an export market, this dictum does nothing
to dilute other holdings taking a "rule of reason" approach to joint ven-
tures. The disturbing language relates to the presumption that anticom-
petitive business attitudes will flow from joint involvement. As stated by
the district court in United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., "[t]o
equate opportunity for wrongdoing with likelihood of its occurrence re-
flects a cynicism toward business behavior which is without warrant. Pre-
sumption of probable wrongdoing cannot be a substitute for its proof.""0
The belief that new business joint ventures are sophisticated devices
which enjoy some degree of immunity under Sherman Act standards is
amply put to rest by Timen Roller Bearing Co. v. United States."1 Al-
though "new business" was not involved in Timken, the case can easily
be extended to new ventures formed for the same purposes as the ven-
"Id. at $57, citing United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
48 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
49 Id. at 963.
90217 F. Supp. 110, 134 (D. Del. 1963).
' 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
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ture in Timken. Timken, an American manufacturer of anti-friction
bearings, owned a substantial interest in a British competitor. Together
they acquired the stock of a French company which was a going concern
and produced the same product. The district court found that under
agreements between them, the three corporations allocated trade territories,
fixed prices on products of one corporation sold in the territory of the
others, cooperated to protect each other's markets and eliminate outside
competition, and participated in cartels to restrict imports to, and ex-
ports from, the United States which was clearly illegal under the Sherman
Act.52
Before the Supreme Court, the defendants contended that any re-
straints of trade could be justified as "reasonable" and not violations of the
Sherman Act because they were ancillary to an otherwise legal joint ven-
ture. The court summarily rejected this contention, stating:
The fact that there is common ownership or control of the contracting
corporations does not liberate them from the impact of the antitrust laws.
... Nor do we find any support in reason or authority for the proposition
that agreements between legally separate persons and companies to suppress
competition among themselves and others can be justified by labeling the
project a 'joint venture.' Perhaps every agreement and combination to
restrain trade could be so labeled. 3
Effect of Motives and Injury to Public. Courts have been cognizant since
the enactment of the Sherman Act that various attempts would be made
by the business community to circumvent its prohibitions to the detriment
of the public interest in maintaining a free enterprise system."' In order for
a venture to survive the "rule of reason" test, the benefits which will ac-
crue to the public, directly or indirectly, must outweigh any anticompeti-
tive effects created by the venture."s Basically, this balancing involves the
assessment of potential advantages and disadvantages in joint ventures
from the point of view of the public interest and the determination of
what characteristics are likely to produce a balance one way or the other.
52 Justice Frankfurter warned in his dissenting opinion that "[e]ven 'cartel' is not a talismanic
word, so as to displace the rule of reason by which breaches of the Sherman Law are determined.
Nor is 'division of territory' so self-operating a category of Sherman Law violations as to dispense
with analysis of the practical consequences of what on paper is a geographic division of territory."
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 605 (1951).
5a Id. at 598. Additional cases on conspiracy between a parent corporation and its subsidiary
include: Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948); Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States,
334 U.S. 110 (1948); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947); United States v.
General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941). See also
REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE To STUDY ANTITRUST LAwS 34-35
(1955); Sprunk, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy, 9 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 20 (1956).
S As forcefully stated in the 1911 American Tobacco case, the generic designation
of the first and second sections of the law, when taken together, embraced every
conceivable act which could possibly come within the spirit or purpose of the pro-
hibitions of the law, without 'regard to the garb in which such acts were clothed.
That is to say, it was held that in view of the general language of the statute and
the public policy which it manifested, there was no possibility of frustrating that
policy by resorting to any disguise or subterfuge of form . ...
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 181 (1911).
" Sandidge v. Rogers, 167 F. Supp. 553 (S.D. Ind. 1958); Tractenberg, supra note 3, at 805.
1969]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Public injury is not a separate and distinct element which must be shown
before a violation of the Sherman Act can be found," but is part of the
test of unreasonable restraint of trade. If a venture is tested under Sher-
man Act standards, and tends or is reasonably calculated to prejudice the
public interest, it will be forbidden as unreasonably restraining trade."
Examples of joint ventures which could be declared unlawful under
the Sherman Act are those formed for the purpose or having the effect
of the following types of public injury: Obstructing interstate com-
merce,"5 increasing costs and declining services,"' imposing an economic
burden on the public by controlling or increasing prices,"° limiting the
availability of a product to the public by restricting production," divid-
ing markets,"' and possessing such undue market power as to eliminate
or seriously lessen competition."
In summary, a joint venture should be condemned only upon specific
proof that by reason of intent of the parents or by the inherent nature
of the venture, it will prejudice the public interest by unduly restricting
competition or unduly obstructing the due course of trade."4 The question
is basically one of fact. Where the true motive behind the venture is
furtherance of an anticompetitive advantage, a violation of the Sherman
Act should be found."5 Generally, good intentions or motives are irrele-
vant. If the necessary result of a joint venture is to restrain trade, the
intent with which the venture was formed is of no consequence."6 How-
ever, where there is only a probability of trade restraint, lack of anti-
"
5 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); Klor's, Inc.
v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Switzer Bros. v. Locklin, 297 F.2d 39 (7th Cir.
1961); Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 295 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1961).
57Rogers v. Douglas Tobacco Board of Trade, Inc., 266 F.2d 636, 644 (5th Cir. 1959).
"Appellees seem to make some distinction between an unreasonable restraint and the principle that
the public rights must be violated before an offense is committed. These are merely different ways
of saying the same thing." Lynch v. Magnavox Co., 94 F.2d 883, 891 (9th Cir. 1938).
5 Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Larson, 257 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1958).
SoParmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 144 F. Supp. 480 (N.D. Il1. 1956).
O Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); Riggall v. Washington
County Medical Soc'y, 249 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1957). But see Bork, supra note 28, at 461-64.
61Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
6s Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. National
Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947) (division of titanium market); United States v. American To-
bacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504
(S.D.N.Y. 1951); United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass.
1950); United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949) (cartel arrangements
in the electric light industry); see W. FUGATE, supra note 35, at 258; C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER,
supra note 18, at 136.
65 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (non-association newspapers were permitted to join on reasonable
terms); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912) (a joint venture terminal
which controlled railroad access was required to permit other railroads to utilize the venture
facilities on a non-discriminatory basis); American TCP Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 127 F. Supp. 208
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).64 Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1
(1911); C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, suPra note 18, at 137.
""It has long been established that the legality of the means selected to effectuate an unlawful
purpose does not immunize those engaged in the conspiracy to accomplish it." United States v.
General Dyestuff Corp., 57 F. Supp. 642, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
OeUnited States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Trenton




competitive intent should become important." Knowledge of intent can
assist the court in interpreting facts and predicting probable results."8
The Supreme Court recently held that the Clayton Act is applicable to
new business joint ventures. For this reason, the importance of Sherman
Act sanctions inevitably will diminish. The purpose of this analysis in
some detail is to demonstrate the complete sufficiency of these sanctions
to reach all conceivable forms of anticompetitive subterfuges which joint
ventures may pose. The Sherman Act, through the "rule of reason" ap-
proach, is imbued with the necessary flexibility to deal with sophisticated
challenges to healthy market conditions and could adequately protect
public interest in curbing anticompetitive joint ventures without stifling
those that will constructively contribute to the economy. The glaring
inadequacies of section 7 of the Clayton Act in dealing with new compe-
tition will be amply developed with the purpose of advocating sole reli-
ance on the Sherman Act in new business joint venture cases.
III. "PLOWING NEW GROUND": THE PENN-OLIN CASE
First District Court Decision. Penn-Olin is a new business joint venture
organized on February 25, 1960, by Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation
and Pennsalt Chemical Corporation to produce and sell sodium chlorate
in the Southeastern United States. Under their agreement each of the joint
venturers owns fifty per cent of the stock of Penn-Olin, and each com-
pany is represented by an equal number of officers and directors. Penn-
Olin constructed a plant at Calvert City, Kentucky, with a production
capacity of over 25,000 tons of sodium chlorate per year at a cost in excess
of six and one-half million dollars. Under the operating arrangement,
Pennsalt personnel are involved primarily in the manufacturing function
while Olin Mathieson personnel primarily perform the sales function for
the venture. On January 6, 1961, the United States filed suit charging
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act.
The Sherman Act segment of the complaint charged that the joint ven-
ture (1) was the outgrowth of a conspiracy between Pennsalt and Olin
dating back to 1957 to divide and allocate markets so as to eliminate and
avoid all competition between them in the production and sale of sodium
chlorate, and (2) unreasonably restrained trade in both sodium chlorate
and other competitive products of the parents.
Applicability of the Clayton Act was based on amended section 7 on
the theory that concurrent acquisition by Pennsalt and Olin of stock in
their new creation was tantamount to an indirect acquisition by each of
the assets of the other. As passed in 1914, section 7 was limited to stock
acquisitions and did not reach asset acquisitions. This obvious loophole
67 United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324 (1912). But see United States v. First Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
" Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); United States v. Union Pac. R.R.,
226 U.S. 61 (1912). "When a combination through its actual operation results in an unreasonable
restraint, intent or purpose may be inferred; even though no unreasonable restraint may be
achieved, nevertheless a finding of specific intent to accomplish such an unreasonable restraint
may render the actor liable under the Sherman Act." United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334
U.S. 495, 525 (1948).
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made it an ineffectual restraint on corporate mergers and ultimately led to
enactment of the Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger Act of 1950. The con-
trast of the old section 7 with the new can be illustrated by italicizing
the added language and bracketing the deleted language:
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in com-
merce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the
effect of such acquisition may be [to] substantially to lessen competition,
[between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corporation
making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any section or
community,] or to tend to create a monopoly [of any line of commerce]."0
In response, the defendants denied the substantive allegations of the
complaint and further asserted the inapplicability of the Clayton Act on
the grounds that Penn-Olin was not "engaged also in commerce" at the
time of its formation and stock acquisition by the parents. In the alterna-
tive defendants claimed that Penn-Olin was a subsidiary corporation and
entitled to treatment as such under a separate paragraph of section 7
which had not been involved in litigation since original enactment in
1914.1
The Government's allegation of conspiracy in restraint of trade was
based upon two agreements between the parents prior to the venture for-
mation. In December 1957, the parents entered into a sales agreement to
test the Southeastern market. Under this agreement Pennsalt made available
to Olin 2,000 tons of sodium chlorate per year to be sold only to pulp
and paper mills in the Southeast, except for one company which Pennsalt
reserved the right to serve directly. By further agreement in February
1958, the parents agreed that neither would move independently into
the Southeastern chlorate market without advising the other and further
agreed to bring to each other's attention any unusual development which
might make it desirable to proceed with production plans."
Unfortunately, the district court's first decision7 did not face squarely
the challenges before it, but proceeded to examine the facts as if section
7 were applicable. Thus, the Sherman Act allegations were disregarded
because "the anticompetitive standard imposed by Section 7 . . . is less
6 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
7O3 8 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
71 This alternative will be discussed in full, infra, notes 142-47, and accompanying text.
7 The sales arrangement allocated geographical and consumer markets for the sale of
sodium chlorate. Its effect was to bar Pennsalt from any exploration of the south-
eastern pulp market for itself. At the same time it kept Olin from selling in any of
the remaining areas where Pennsalt competed. The division of territory thus under-
taken was substantially carried forward into Penn-Olin.
The February 1958 production arrangement, while less tangible, effectively
destroyed all remaining opportunities for competition. By agreeing to consult on
future plans, and thereafter respecting that pledge, promising plans for independent
Eastern production by Pennsalt and Olin were thwarted.
Post-Trial brief of the United States at 16, United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 217 F. Supp.
110 (D. Del. 1963).
7 United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963).
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stringent than that of the Sherman Act.""' The court passed over the
jurisdictional question of whether the venture was "engaged in commerce"
at the time of the asserted indirect acquisition of assets, and further re-
fused to consider whether Penn-Olin was entitled to subsidiary status
under section 7. The three basic aspects of every proper section 7 case
were set out: "[w]hether the effect of the joint venture: (1) May be to
lessen substantially competition or tend to create a monopoly; (2) In any
section of the country; (3) In any line of commerce.""
While this standard can be concisely stated, the magnitude of the dif-
ficulties in making predictable interpretations cannot be over-emphasized.
However, in Penn-Olin the parties greatly reduced the court's assumed
task by stipulating that two lines of commerce were relevant: Sodium
chlorate and calcium hypochlorite (one of five non-chlorate chemicals in
which Pennsalt and Olin were actual competitors)."'
With respect to the relevant geographical market, the Government
sought to establish a national market in which to measure competitive
effects, while the defendants successfully prevailed in demonstrating that
the realistic area of effective competition for Penn-Olin was the South-
eastern market comprising fourteen states. Prior to the venture formation,
Hooker Chemical Corporation and American Potash Chemical Corpora-
tion had a "virtual monopoly" in this area amounting to over ninety per
cent of sodium chlorate sales, while Pennsalt accounted for slightly less
than nine per cent of the production sold in that market.
In a very careful analysis of the issue, the district court found that
Pennsalt, with its sole production facility in Portland, Oregon, could
not compete effectively in the Southeast with respect to price, service, or
assured source of supply.77 Furthermore, the court found that producers
east of the Rockies could not favorably compete with production facilities
west of the Rockies.7 " Olin, having never produced sodium chlorate in the
Southeast or elsewhere, was not an actual competitor of any of the market
occupants.
With respect to the venture's status, the combination was found to
be in the nature of a conglomerate joint venture."' The ultimate issue
was whether this conglomerate combination resulted, or as a reasonable
probability" would result, in a substantial lessening of competition or
7'Id. at 115, citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 329 (1962).
75217 F. Supp. at 115.
78 Chosen as a "guinea pig" to test competitive effects of related products. Competition in
calcium hypochlorite was substantial in that the venture parents accounted for 88.8% of the
national market.
77 217 F. Supp. at 120-21.
"8Id. at 122. Contrast this finding with Rand Dixon's statement that Pennsalt was "an am-
bitious newcomer in this field in the East." Dixon, supra note 8, at 405.
""The creation of Penn-Olin did not represent a combination of companies which were com-
peting in the manufacture and sale of sodium chlorate in the southeastern market or elsewhere.
Nor did it represent a combination of companies standing in the relationship of supplier and
customer in the southeastern market or elsewhere. It was neither a vertical combination or a
horizontal combination." 217 F. Supp. at 124.
s The final Senate Report on amended section 7 was explicit on maintaining a distinction be-
tween possibility and probability. "The use of these words ('may be') means that the bill, if en-
acted, would not apply to the mere possibility but only to the reasonable probability of the pre-
scribed [sic] effect." S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., at 6 (1950).
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would tend to create a monopoly. The crux of the substantial lessening
controversy centered around the Government's "novel and far reaching""s
argument that since Pennsalt and Olin could have competed on an indi-
vidual basis, antitrust law required that they do so or not enter the mar-
ket at all. This assertion ignores relevant economic factors relating to
whether or not Pennsalt and Olin would have entered the relevant mar-
ket individually,"2 and clearly draws the line between conflicting antitrust
philosophies.
The district court properly disposed of the Government's position,
which if adopted would have sounded the death knell to all significant
future contributions to the economy by joint ventures. According to the
court, the government's theory "would substitute a conclusive presump-
tion that any combination specified in Section 7 between companies hav-
ing the overall capability to go into business alone has a pernicious ef-
fect on competition and lacks any redeeming virtue; it would make any
such combination illegal per se. No precedent supports the Government's
position and its lack of logic condemns it.""3 The Supreme Court did
not disturb this eminently sound holding on appeal, which hopefully will
and should forever put to rest the concept that new business ventures as
such are subject to per se illegality attacks. As joint ventures are entitled
to a "rule of reason" approach under the Sherman Act, they are entitled,
at a minimum, to an examination of the relevant economic factors sur-
rounding the venture in the market place under section 7.
Although Penn-Olin was basically a conglomerate venture, it was not
without horizontal and vertical aspects. Prior to the venture formation,
Pennsalt held 8.9 per cent of the relevant Southeastern market. Formation
of Penn-Olin removed Pennsalt as an independent competitor in the
Southeast. Ending the inquiry here would be as untenable as the Govern-
ment's per se approach. Whether a venture will have forbidden horizontal
effects under section 7 cannot be measured merely by looking at the re-
sultant activities of the parents."' Pennsalt's relatively insignificant posi-
tion in the Southeast with its attendant competitive disadvantages was re-
placed amply by creation of Penn-Olin. The competitive benefits in the
relevant market far exceeded any competitive loss resulting from Penn-
salt's elimination."
With respect to the possible vertical aspect of the venture, Olin was a
substantial buyer of sodium chlorate from Hooker's Niagara Falls plant.
These purchases fulfilled Olin's neighboring plant's requirement for the
manufacture of sodium chlorite. The Government asserted that the yen-
81217 F. Supp. at 123.
82 Id. at 124.
83 Id. The Court cited United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41,
219-20 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956) and pointed out that it is not per se illegal
for actual competitors to form a joint venture under the Sherman Act, and that a determination
of unreasonableness is essential to illegality. The Government's position is even more untenable
by reason of Pennsalt and Olin not being actual competitors.
84217 F. Supp. at 125. "The 1950 amendments made plain Congress' intent that the validity
of.such combinations was to be gauged on a broader scale: their effect on competition generally
in an economically significant market." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 335 (1962).
85217 F. Supp. at 125.
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ture formation would make Olin a captive buyer from Penn-Olin, and
thereby foreclose Hooker and other suppliers from obtaining this busi-
ness from Olin. The district court found that the record before it gave
no indication as to how Olin would resolve the conflicting considerations of
being a fifty per cent owner in the venture and the inherent advantages
of a "next door" supplier, but pointed out that regardless of this possible
foreclosure, it would not diminish competition in the Southeast." Even if
we assume a forbidden vertical foreclosure would result from this aspect of
the venture, a remedy better than invalidating the venture might be a
decree preventing Olin from making purchases from its joint subsidiary.
Since the venture provided a robust new competitor for its relevant mar-
ket, it should not be condemned by a proven forbidden ancillary restraint
in an unrelated market which is easily curable.
With respect to the existing competition between the parents in non-
chlorate chemicals, calcium hypochlorite was selected to test possible re-
straints. The Government dusted off the old rusty saw that the common
meeting ground provided by the venture setting would lead inevitably to
discussions of all phases of the non-chlorate business, and that it would
"defy human nature" for the parents to maintain their competitive zeal
in the competing products. No evidence was presented of actual or threat-
ened collusion. Thus, the Government again attempted to exalt mere pos-
sibility as a well from which substantial lessening of competition necessar-
ily would flow, and conveniently overlooked the delineation between pos-
sibility and probability which has been acknowledged by the Supreme
Court."
There is no question that a joint venture involving parents with com-
peting products provides a forum more conducive to wrongdoing than
luncheon clubs, country clubs, trade associations and the like, but mere
opportunity is not enough. With no proof offered, the court had no basis
to infer wrongdoing under either the Sherman Act or section 7. With the
Southeast established as the relevant market, the horizontal and vertical
effects found inconsequential, evidence of foreclosure of competition be-
tween parents' competing products found lacking, and the overall com-
petitive situation in the Southeast clearly improved, the focal point of the
Government's case became foreclosure of potential competition between
the parents.
While a new business joint venture always increases by one the num-
ber of actual competitors, in many cases it reduces the number of potential
competitors. At the time of venture formation, both Pennsalt and Olin
had extensive knowledge pertaining to sodium chlorate. Pennsalt had
been engaged in manufacture and sale for years. Olin had never been a
" Id. at 126. Although not a joint venture case, United States v. National City Lines, 186
F.2d 562 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 916 (1951), holds that stock ownership in a con-
suming corporation is illegal even though all parents are noncompetitive in nature. National City
Lines was operating bus services in a number of cities. It sold preferred stock to the manufac-
turers of buses, tires, gasoline and other products consumed in rendering transportation services.
This was held to violate the Sherman Act because rival manufacturers were foreclosed from mak-
ing substantial sales to National.
"
7Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); see id. at 323 n.39.
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commercial manufacturer, but had substantial sales contacts in the South-
east and elsewhere by reason of its patented bleaching process (requiring
sodium chlorate) used by pulp and paper processors, and had developed
substantially a feasible commercial production process. Neither parent
had rejected completely the idea of individual entry at the time of venture
formation, but both had grave doubts as to feasibility from a projected
profit standpoint.
Both parents had suitable locations for building a plant, and financing
would not have been a problem for either company. Each possessed the
resources and general capabilities needed to enter the Southeast singly,
and could have competed at a profit. The Government's contention was
that but for the venture, the probabilities were that both parents would
have entered alone. This contention, if properly proven, would be com-
pelling from a policy standpoint of encouraging individual entry. Thus,
the task of the court was to predict what actions the parents probably
would have taken if the venture had not been created, and measure these
predicted actions against the standard of substantial lessening of competi-
tion.
A key holding by the district court was that the capability of both
parents to build plants and compete individually was of no controlling sig-
nificance." Capacity and interest present no more than a possibility of
entry, and should be important only as factors considered in the overall
determination of reasonable probability. The court conducted a thorough
examination of the factual setting from which the venture emerged (in-
cluding analysis of numerous staff reports containing recommendations and
profit projections, prior agreements between Pennsalt and Olin, and testi-
mony of company principals) and concluded as a matter of reasonable
probability that both parents would not have entered the Southeast absent
venture formation. With respect to the possibility of one parent entering
the market individually, the district court imposed a strict burden of
proof on the Government. "If Penn-Olin had the effect of keeping Penn-
salt or Olin out of the southeastern market, it runs afoul of Section 7 only
if competition generally in the Southeast will probably be substantially
less under the joint entry by Pennsalt and Olin via Penn-Olin than it
would have been if there had been individual entry by either Olin or
Pennsalt."'i
The Government's argument that the venture must be automatically
condemned if either parent would have entered, was characterized as
cutting "the heart out of Section 7."' The court's position points up the
inherent difficulty of applying an anti-merger statute to the creation of
a new entity. Removal of an established entity, especially a horizontal
one, provides a basis of assessing the competitive effects before and after
the combination based on prior performance. As pointed out, "lessening"
is a word of comparison, and the challenged transaction must be com-





pared with what would have existed otherwise. Since actual competition
was not reduced, but in fact substantially augmented, the Government
was placed in the unenviable position of trying to prove that individual
entry by either company would have increased the level of competition
more than joint entry by the parents. This burden could not be overcome,
thus leading to appeal to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court Opinion. Upon direct appeal of the district court's
decision, the Supreme Court held that there was no violation of section
1 of the Sherman Act.9' However, in the most significant extension of sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act since its enactment, the Supreme Court express-
ly held it applicable when two corporations create a joint venture to en-
gage in a wholly new enterprise."2
A primary departure from the district court's analysis centered on
that court's conclusion that since it was not reasonably probable that both
parents would have independently entered the market, there was not a
substantial lessening of competition. According to the Supreme Court,
"[t]here still remained for consideration the fact that Penn-Olin elim-
inated the potential competition of the corporation that might have re-
mained at the edge of the market, continually threatening to enter."'"
The case was remanded for a determination of whether either one of the
parents would have entered the market as a reasonable probability, while
the other remained a significant potential competitor. This narrow holding
seeks to determine whether the joint venture would provide substantially
less stimulus to competition than if one parent entered the market and the
other remained at the edge of the market. Such a determination forces a
careful analysis of all possible market combinations for measuring com-
petitive effects of the venture formation, but unfortunately requires in-
quiry into a hypothesis (one parent entering) upon a hypothesis (other
parent remaining at the market's edge) to determine reasonable probabil-
ity of substantial lessening of competition. The real criticism of the
Supreme Court's opinion-other than its finding of applicability of sec-
tion 7-is its attitude toward the problem of proof with respect to rea-
onable probability of entry. The Court cited all factors contained in the
record which clearly established Pennsalt and Olin as potential entrants in
the Southeast market, 4 and observed that "[u]nless we are going to re-
quire subjective evidence, this array of probability certainly reaches the
prima facie stage."'" The proposition advanced by the Court is that a
technical capacity and interest in entry on the part of a potential competi-
tor present a prima facie case that entry by that company is reasonably
"United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 161 (1964).
21d. at 168, citing United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 343 (1963);
cf. United Gas Improvement Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 381 U.S. 392 (1965).
'a 378 U.S. at 173. Note: The district court found the record disclosed "no clue" as to how
one parent would have reacted if the other parent had chosen to enter individually. 217 F. Supp.
at 130. The phrase "no clue" is unfortunate and can be criticized in that a possibility of individual
entry by the remaining parent existed, however likely or unlikely.
"4378 U.S. at 175.
" Id. "Potential competition cannot be put to a subjective test." Id. at 174.
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probable in the absence of venture formation." This approach adds con-
fusion to any meaningful distinction between a possibility-probability de-
lineation. In addition, it raises the basic question of the relative values of
actual and potential competition in terms of competitive impact, and a
proper separation of the two.
District Court's Remand Decision. Upon remand,' the parties were able
to agree on two issues before the district court. The first issue to be de-
termined was whether there was a reasonable probability, but for the for-
mation of Penn-Olin, that either parent would have constructed a plant
in the Southeast." If this issue was resolved in favor of the Government,
the second issue was: if either parent had entered the Southeast individual-
ly, would the other parent have maintained, as a reasonable probability,
such continued interest in the Southeastern sodium chlorate market as to
make it a significant potential competitor. An adverse ruling for the Gov-
ernment on either issue would require dismissal of the action.
The Government contended that a favorable finding for it on the first
two issues would require a conclusion that the venture probably had the
effect of substantially lessening competition. The defendants contended
these findings would present only a possible basis for such conclusions,
depending upon an evaluation of additional evidence, and that a third
issue must be faced." This issue was "[w]hether the organization of Penn-
Olin, as a reasonable probability, resulted in substantially less competition
than would have existed if either Olin or Pennsalt had constructed a so-
dium chlorate plant in the Southeast while the other continued to have
an interest in constructing such a plant..... This issue was never reached
because the court found adversely to the Government on the first issue.
Although the third issue was not considered, it illustrates the proper
determination which must be made unless the proper section 7 standard of
"substantially lessening competition" is to be ignored. Inherent in any new
business venture formation is a new competitive entity in the relevant
market. If the venture is successful as in the case of Penn-Olin, competi-
tion is thereby increased. If the Government undertakes to attack an in-
crease in competition in its incipiency, it should bear the full burden of
proving that this increase, as a matter of reasonable probability, is sub-
stantially less than would have occurred but for the venture formation.
As to the first issue, the district court rejected the Supreme Court's
suggestion that overall capacity and interest may establish a prima facie
case of entry, and held that, as a matter of reasonable probability, neither
Pennsalt nor Olin would have made independent entry into the South-
eastern market in the absence of the joint venture. The Government was
held, properly, to a strict standard of proof based upon a preponderance
of the evidence and failed to carry the burden. Of particular significance
"Comment, supra note 17, at 111.
"






was that the court reached its conclusion that neither parent would have
entered the market only after a penetrating analysis of the motivations
of each particular parent.
Upon appeal of this remand decision, the judgment of the district court
was affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court without opinion."'
This second appeal was based on the Government's position that the lower
court improperly applied a standard of subjective intent in determining
that neither parent would have entered the market independently. The
primary contention was that "subjective" evidence concerning what top
management thought or said about individual entry was far less probative
than "objective" economic evidence based on capacity and incentives for
individual entry. It was argued that all evidence on market behavior
after venture formation had little bearing on the issue of probability of
entry. With respect to potential competition, it was urged that entry by
one parent would not have deterred interest or entry by the remaining
parent because Pittsburgh Plate Glass entered the expanding market after
venture formation. The Government's position that a section 7 violation
exists if one parent would have entered while the other hovered on the
side was also reasserted."'
In the response, defendants urged that Penn-Olin was distinguishable
from every other section 7 case which had been before the Supreme Court
because neither of the parents had been in the relevant market."'3 A merger
between actual and potential competitors involves some subtraction of
competition. But in Penn-Olin there was no subtraction; the combination
increased competition in the market. With respect to probability of inde-
pendent entry, defendants acknowledged that the Government did not
have to establish actual intent, but reminded the court that "the burden
is not on us to establish impossibility of entry but is on the government
to establish probability."' The further contention was made that prob-
ability of entry is solely a question of fact-not an antitrust issue-which
should be determined before the antitrust issue of probability of sub-
stantial lessening of competition can be treated. In this connection, events
occurring after venture formation would have an important bearing in
that a new business venture can act only prospectively, while a merger's
foreclosure is present."'
Identifying Potential Competitors--Subjective vs. Objective Standard. The
lack of validity of an objective capacity-plus-interest approach as as-
101 Justice Marshall did not participate. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 389 U.S. 308
(1967).
'
01 2 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP., No. 335, at A-1 to A-4 (Dec. 12, 1967).
03 The main cases relied on by the Government were distinguished as involving quite different
circumstances: FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. $68 (1967) (only one significant po-
tential competitor for the market); United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964)
(involving both *actual and potential competition between two companies); United States v. 'El
Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964) (involving actual competitors in reality).
I' ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP., No. 335, at A-5 (Dec. 12, 1967).
is,"The difference, of course, is that the merger's foreclosure is present while the joi't Ven-
ture's is prospective." 378 U.S. at 173-74.
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serted by the Government becomes readily apparent when the parents are
large diversified corporations. Such companies have numerous arenas of
know-how, financing, and manpower, and are generally in quest of ex-
pansion via attractive investment opportunities. These companies may, in
a general sense, be considered potential competitors in many fields."' 6 The
practical result of adopting the suggested prima facie approach is to place
the entire burden of proof on these venturers to show cause why they
should not be divested of their progeny.""
The district court's analysis of Olin in its second decision provides an
excellent example of the decision-making process of a large diversified cor-
poration. Olin was organized into seven separate operating divisions, but
all new projects and substantial expenditures required approval on the
corporate level. Proposals from each division were in competition for avail-
able funds and profit opportunities recommended by other divisions. Once
a year each division prepared a report covering a multitude of expendi-
tures and projects deemed advisable to pursue in the next five years. This
report was presented to a staff of experts on the corporate level, which
met with division personnel before accepting or rejecting each proposal,
in whole or in part. If the proposal survived this hurdle, it was passed on
to the Capital Appropriations Requirements Committee for further delib-
eration and ultimate rejection or favorable recommendation to the cor-
porate president. Any project such as Penn-Olin requiring an expenditure
over $2 5,000 had to go to the Board of Directors with the president's ap-
proval before any final decision could be reached.
A determination as to whether Olin was a potential competitor would
have been simple had Olin's Board of Directors initially opted to make an
independent entry and then later formed a new decision to enter via the
venture. Extenuating circumstances other than attempting to avoid com-
petition may cause such a course of action, but it is difficult to imagine a
situation more closely approximating certainty of potential competition.
Since the statute does not require a finding of certainty, a fair solution
would be to drop back to the presidential level. Thus, a project recom-
mended to the Board of Directors by Olin's president could be considered
as a reasonably probable undertaking. As the district court pointed out,
it is "essential to distinguish between the views and actions of those in the
Olin organization who were charged with decision-making responsibility,
and those whose function it was to make preliminary studies and recom-
mendations. Obviously the former are vastly more significant than those
of the latter in predicting hypothetically what Olin would have done but
10' "The courts will be blinding themselves to business reality if it is not recognized that be-
fore embarking upon a joint venture each parent will evince an interest in independent entry
into the market in question, if it has capacity for such entry." Comment, stepra note 17, at 113.
107 It has been suggested that overall capacity by the parents to enter the market individually
at a profit should establish a presumption that they "would" have done so but for the venture.
The burden of proof would then shift to the parents for rebuttal as they would presumedly be in
the best position to explain the economies of their decision. Note, supra note 18, at 404.
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for the joint venture.."os This approach strikes a workable medium be-
tween certainty'"5 and possibility."'
One writer suggests as a test for potential competition a rate of return
analysis as reasonably approximating business reality.11' This would apply
after the Government establishes capacity and interest, and would be based
on the particular company's criteria for new investment-especially pro-
jected rate of return-as compared with the studies prepared for pro-
posed individual entry. This approach is far superior to the Supreme
Court's suggested capacity-plus-interest standard, but still leaves the door
open for a multitude of possibilities.
It is proper to assume that the president of a large diversified corpora-
tion will not recommend adoption of proposed projects unless that cor-
poration's rate of return requirement is met and the project is within
the corporation's corporate debt and capital investment limitations. But
the president, being responsible to his board of directors, must satisfy
himself that the appraisals upon which he makes his recommendations are
accurate and realistic. In addition, the president may choose not to rec-
ommend some proposals which satisfy the corporation's rate of return
requirement, but are less favorable than others. In essence, the president's
recommendation can provide a clear and definite line of demarcation for
probable market entry.
Once recommendation is made, the screening task of the president is
concluded and the board of directors must decide which of many re-
maining competing projects appear to be the most favorable. There are
and have been countless corporate presidents who readily would agree
that there is nothing certain about their recommendations being accepted
by their boards."1 Factors for the board's consideration include other
recommended undertakings with higher projected rates of return, pro-
jects with a lower manpower drain, projects with better consumer con-
tacts, 1 3 projects with more technological certainty,"' projects requiring
less capital investment thus allowing more diversification, and projects
facing fewer entry barriers."1
Those astute in the workings of the business world could, no doubt,
add dozens of additional considerations which face a board of directors.
108 246 F. Supp. at 919 (emphasis added).
"'s Note the court's warning that even if the proposal passed muster with the staff, the Capital
Appropriations Requirements Committee, and the president,
no intelligent forecast can be made as to the likelihood of its approval by the Board
of Directors who had the final say. . . . The names of at least some of the . . . mem-
bers mark them as men of broad financial and business experience. Whether these
men were hypercritical or easily persuaded to accept management proposals is not
disclosed. Their record in approving or disapproving such proposals is not revealed.
What their views would have been about a wholly owned chlorate facility which
had been a controversial subject for so many years, cannot be conjectured.
Id. at 927-28.
110Note 80 supra.
ill Comment, supra note 17, at 114.
"'Only two officers of Olin, including the president, had votes on its fifteen-member Board.
... Olin had excellent consumer relations in the Southeast, but Pennsalt did not.
114Olin had never commercially produced sodium chlorate.




Limiting the Government's burden of proof to establishing that the pro-
posed project was within that corporation's rate of return criteria does not
sufficiently establish reasonable probability. Conduct of an average reason-
able corporation should be irrelevant in this prediction of probable con-
sequences. Only by concentrating on the specific company in question
can the courts make an intelligent forecast. The factors that make a par-
ticular company a potential competitor in a general sense, such as capacity,
interest, and reasonable rate of return, do not have controlling significance
as to how the particular corporation might have proceeded.11
Potential Competition in Proper Perspective. The Supreme Court in
Penn-Olin was concerned expressly with the competitive effects of the
venture formation, and the case ultimately evolved into the question of
foreclosure of potential competition. The effect of elimination of poten-
tial competition should approximate removal of actual competition (i.e.,
removal of a present, identifiable force, increased economic power of
market occupants and tendency to create a monopoly).1' When analyz-
ing this foreclosure as a result of a joint venture, the courts will be
forced to evaluate an uncertain quality (potential competition) in the
context of an uncertain legal standard (incipient threats) in the face of an
increase in actual competition.
No meaningful discussion can be had on the trouble and confusion
surrounding "potential competition" without recognizing the two differ-
ent legal uses of the term. Distinction should be made between (1) a con-
dition of freedom of future entry in the relevant market, and (2) a
condition of positive competitive force due to the immediate threat of
110 Taking the suggested approach one step further, suppose it can be established as a certainty
or reasonable probability that Pennsalt or another competitor planned to enter the market indi-
vidually. If Olin's staff and president knew of this intention prior to a recommendation to the
Board, the recommendation would still be valid toward establishing Olin's probable action. Any
earlier studies would be adjusted to take into account the new entrant. Should a certain or probable
entrant emerge prior to Board consideration, deliberation would necessarily revolve around this
new. factor. If the recommendation were rejected outright, Olin could no longer be considered
to be "at the edge of the market, continually threatening.to enter."
If the proposal were returned for additional study, Olin would still be considered a potential
entrant, but additional factors must be considered before a determination of impact in the market
olace as a potential competitor could be derived. At this point, it would be proper to consider
Olin as a significant potential competitor, exerting an influence in the market place, if its estab-
lished new business rate of return criteria-adjusted for the new or probable entrant-was satisfied.
" In the El Paso Natural Gas merger case, United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S.
65.1 (1964), the Supreme Court ordered divestiture of Pacific Northwest by El Paso. Pacific
Northwest was found to have been a substantial factor in the relevant Southern California market
even though it had no pipelines into California and had been unsuccessful in its attempts to sell
gas there.
-The effect on competition in a particular market through acquisition of another
company is determined by the nature or extent of that market and by the nearness
of the absorbed company to it, that company's eagerness to enter that market, its
resourcefulness, and so on. .... Unsuccessful bidders are no less-competitors than
the successful one. The presence of two or-more -suppliers gives buyers a choice.
Pacific Northwest was no feeble, failing company; nor was it inexperienced and lack-
ing in resourcefulness. It was one of two major interstate pipelines serving the trans-
Rocky Mountain States . . . . It had adequate reserves' and 'managerial skill. It was
so strong and militant that-it was-viewed with concern, and covered, by El Paso.
Id. at 660-61. See generally Aluminum Co. of'America-v. FTC, 284 F. 401 (3d Cir.' 1922), cert.
denied, 261 U.S. 616 (1923); Hale & Hale, Potential Competition Under Section 7: The Suprense
Court's Crystal Ball, -1964 SuP. CT. REv. 171; O'Brien; Potential Competition Under the Sherman
Act Cases, 12 ABA ANTrrsursT SECTION 105 (1958).
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new entry by an identified firm.'18 The first use of the term is concerned
with the opportunities in general for entry by new companies or for ex-
pansion of existing companies into a particular relevant market. This use
has reference to the traditional "relevant economic factors" analysis which
courts undergo in determining the effect of mergers upon actual com-
petition."' A showing that a venture substantially raises barriers of fu-
ture entry, thereby reducing potential competition in this general sense,
would be but one factor for a court's consideration in determining whether
the venture substantially lessens actual competition. The second use of the
term refers to the elimination of competition that section 7 was designed
to protect, and requires reading the statute to proscribe what "may be
substantially to lessen potential competition.""'  Although the Supreme
Court did not specifically delineate between these two concepts of poten-
tial competition it is reasonable to conclude, for the purposes of Penn-
Olin, that the Court was concerned with protecting potential competition
which exerts a positive competitive impact on the relevant market."' The
presence of this type of potential competition should not be over-estimated
however, as it alone will never supplant the competitive impact of actual
competition provided by a venture.
In a joint venture setting, competition in the relevant market is aug-
mented substantially if the venture is successful. In a concentrated indus-
try, the market power of established firms will be diminished, the num-
ber of competing firms increased, the relative size and market shares re-
duced, and the industry's structure one step less oligopolistic. This was the
result of the Penn-Olin venture, and should have been considered as cheer-
ful news by all anti-concentration analysts.
In pursuance of the test proposed by the Supreme Court, suppose it is
determined that one of the parents would have entered the relevant mar-
ket, while the other parent remained at the edge threatening entry. The
Government's burden of proof, at this point at least, should be to show
by a preponderance of the evidence that the increase in competition af-
forded by the venture may be substantially less than the combined market
influence of the one parent's entering individually plus the other's mar-
ket effect as an imminent entrant. While this approach requires (1) as-
sessment of the increase in actual competition afforded by a venture, (2)
speculation on the amount of increase in competition which one entering
parent would provide, and (3) conjecture on the marketing impact of
"' Rahl, Applicability of the Clayton Act to Potential Competition, 12 ABA ANTITRUST SEC-
TION 128, 132 (1958).
" Includes degree of concentration in an industry, relative size of firms, number of com-
peting firms, prior histories of mergers in the industry, degree of competition between merging
firms, and overall behavior of the industry. For excellent discussion in terms of market power,
see Dean & Gustus, Vertical Integration and Section 7, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 672 (1965).
'20 In merger cases, potential competition sought to be protected should possess "positive sub-
stantial competitive force of such degree as to rank with actual competition and further . . . [be]
great enough in and of itself to qualify for statutory protection." Rahl, supra note 118,- at 133.
"'The existence of an aggressive well equipped and well financed corporation engaged in the
same or related lines of commerce waiting anxiously to enter an oligopolistic market would be a
substantial incentive to competition which cannot be underestimated." 378 U.S. at 174.
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the waiting non-entering parent, it is the only proper avenue to reach
the statutory standard.
Another essential requirement in a proper burden of proof should be the
identification of the firm or firms exerting the competitive influence
sought to be protected. In venture cases this normally would be one par-
ent or the other. But the contention can also be made that the joint ven-
ture may foreclose entry by other non-parent competitors. In this situa-
tion, the Government should be compelled to identify the particular po-
tential competitor source sought to be protected, and to show how this
force substituted for or supplemented actual competition so that its removal
after the venture's entry substantially would lessen overall competition
in the relevant market as a matter of reasonable probability. This proof
should show that conditions of entry were good for this particular poten-
tial competitor; otherwise its threat of entry could not exert an important
force on the relevant market. Thus, the Government must prove a factual
background substantially the opposite of that which it must prove in a
regular section 7 merger case involving a foreclosure of actual competi-
tion, where prosecutors normally attempt to establish high entry barriers.
Attempts to balance the benefits of increased actual competition against
the loss of potential competition only point to the basic weakness of em-
phasizing potential competition in a joint venture setting. As illustrated
above, it is difficult to identify who may be potential entrants in a par-
ticular market. Changes in management goals, technology, and economic
conditions can alter quite suddenly the status of would-be entrants."
Venture formation may or may not deter would-be entrants," whose
presence and effect should be determined and accumulated with the effect
of foreclosure of potential competition of the parent that would have
remained at the market's edge but for the venture. If other potential
competitors remain at the market's edge after venture formation, any
void created by the loss of potential competition from a would-be re-
maining parent is substantially filled. A determination should also be
made as to what effect individual entry by one parent would have had
on the anxiousness of the remaining parent. Loss of interest by this parent
may or may not have any effect upon other expanding companies.
From the standpoint of judicial administration, it seems very desirable
to de-emphasize the importance of potential competition as much as pos-
sible in joint venture cases, except in the most obvious situations. Tests
for determining the identity of potential entrants, whether in terms of
internal corporate intent as suggested herein or in terms of capacity-plus-
interest as pressed by the Government, "tend to mire antitrust proceedings
in a prolonged and unsatisfactory examination of what corporate officials
either intended as to themselves or understood regarding others." '24 At-
tempts to prove the probable effect of an identified potential entrant must
2 Backman, supra note 10, at 669-70.
121 Pittsburgh Plate Glass entered the relevant market subsequent to Penn-Olin's formation, 217
F. Supp. at 127.
524 Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts-From Economic Theory
to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. Rrv. 285, 332 (1967).
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yield largely unsuccessful results and involve a considerable waste of time
and energy.
When the Government undertakes divestment of the venturers' prog-
eny, it should be required to sustain its full burden of showing reasonable
probability."N Proof of capacity and interest merely lays a foundation for
proof of reasonable probability. Never to be lost in the maze of specula-
tion inherent in the determination of potential competition is the fact
that a joint venture does exert present, actual competition in its relevant
market. The Government's burden should only be discharged if it can
demonstrate that another set of circumstances, which would have oc-
curred as a matter of reasonable probability, would have increased com-
petition more than venture formation. While this position will seem un-
duly harsh to some, it must be remembered that incipient threats to po-
tential future competition are the subjects of the Government's attacks.
This circumstance, in view of an increase in actual competition, mitigates
what might otherwise be an undue burden of proof for the Government.
IV. PROPRIETY OF APPLYING SECTION 7 TO
NEW BUSINESS JOINT VENTURES
Legislative History and Suggested Statutory Construction. In Penn-Olin
the Supreme Court was confronted with applicability of section 7 of the
Clayton Act to new business joint ventures for the first time. The original
enactment of 1914 was prompted by judicial hesitancy to apply the Sher-
man Act with the stringency which Congress desired, and was also directed
toward abuses of holding companies that acquired stock in previously in-
dependent corporations as a device to control or eliminate competition
among them."' It was designed specifically to cope with incipient threats
to competition before they reached Sherman Act proportions."'
The 1950 amendment was designed to plug the assets loophole which
existed in the original Act... by preventing "corporations from acquiring
another corporation by means of acquisition of its assets, where under the
present law it is prohibited from acquiring the stock of said corpora-
tion."...9 The legislative histories of the original enactment and the 1950
amendment contain no references relating to new business joint venture
" "We think it is plain that before a merger may be condemned merely because its effect
may be to lessen potential competition it must be ascertained that the potential competition is a
reality, that is to say, that there is a reasonable probability of such potential competition." United
States v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, 223 F. Supp. 849, 855-56 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
.' H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. at 2 (1914); S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d
Sess. at 1 (1914). The second paragraph of original section 7 was designed to reach holding com-
panies. "No corporation shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock
or other share capital of two or more corporations engaged in commerce where the effect of such
acquisition, or the use of such stock by the voting or granting of proxies or otherwise, may be to
substantially lessen competition between such corporations, or restrain such commerce in any sec-
tion or community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce." 38 Star. 731 (1914).
'1 D. MARTIN, MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON ACT 46 (1959); Votaw, Antitrust in 1914: The
Climate of Opinion, 24 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 14 (1964).
158 96 CONG. REc. 16450 (1950); McAllister, Where the Effect May Be To Substantially Lessen
Competition or Tend To Create a Monopoly, 3 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 124, 139-45 (1953).
... S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. at 2 (1950).
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coverage.' a The Supreme Court in Penn-Olin, however, based its decision
on the amendment to section 7.
The prohibitions contained in amended section 7 basically cover direct
or indirect acquisition by a corporation engaged in interstate commerce
of all or part of the stock or assets of another corporation "engaged also
in commerce." The defendants argued that Penn-Olin was not "engaged
also in commerce" at the time of its formation and stock issuance to the
parents, and therefore was not reached by section 7. The Government
argued that an entity comes within the meaning of section 7 if, at the
time of the challenged acquisition, it is either conducting an interstate
business or is intending or preparing to do so. ' The Supreme Court did
not adopt either of the above arguments, but nevertheless held section 7
applicable.
The Court employed a rather dubious course of reasoning to reach ap-
plicability of this anti-merger statute designed to deal with corporate ex-
tinctions. It held that the test of applicability of the section is the effect
of the acquisition, and that competition between the parents who are
engaged in commerce, and the venture would be substantially lessened,
if not foreclosed." 2 While this broad statement is not necessarily true, it
completely ignores the basic statutory prerequisite that the acquired cor-
poration be engaged in commerce prior to acquisition before there can
be a foreclosure under the terms of the statute. The Court found, how-
ever, that "this logic fails in the light of the wording of the section and
its legislative background; ' 'sn no serious attempt to explain or expound
on either basis was made.
Less alarming was the Court's re-affirmation that competitive effects of
an acquisition are measured from the time of suit rather than from the
time of acquisition."' This judicial tool is necessary for proper determina-
tion in many merger cases, and is even more so in dealing with a new
entity unless substantial lessening of competition is to be based on conjec-
1' "Examination of the committee reports and floor debate in both houses of Congress yields
no suggestion that the 1950 amendment included an effort to extend the law to joint ventures, by
1950 a subject of such grave implications as to have merited extensive committee consideration and
floor debate." Flittie, Status of Joint Venturing Business Combinations Short of Actual Merger
Under the Antitrust Laws, FOURTEENTH INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 313,
340 (S.W. Legal Foundation 1963); Handler & Robinson, A Decade of Administration of the
Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger Act, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 652-74 (1961).
11 Congress plainly did not intend an acquisition of a company, which was conceived
and intended as an interstate firm, to escape the ban of Section 7 merely because,
at the moment of acquisition the company itself had not yet produced or shipped
any of its own goods. On the contrary, . . . the limitation of Section 7 to acquisitions
of stock or assets of corporations 'engaged . . . in (interstate) commerce' reflects
only the Congressional intent that the section would not prevent corporations en-
gaged in interstate commerce from acquiring wholly intrastate firms.
Brief for the United States at 30, United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
132 "Moreover, in this case the progeny was organized to further the business of its parents,
already in commerce, and the fact that it was organized specifically to engage in commerce should
bring it within the coverage of § 7." 378 U.S. at 168. Prior to Supreme Court consideration,
one writer expressed the view that: "To afford immunity to an acquisition which may have all
the effects of a merger simply because it is accomplished indirectly by the formation of a joint
company is to promote form at the expense of substance." Note, Joint Ventures and Section 7
of the Clayton Act, 14 STAN. L. REV. 777, 780 (1962).
'33 378 U.S. at 168.
a4Id., citing United States v. E.. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 607 (1957).
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ture in all but the most obvious cases. This dilemma illustrates the diffi-
culty inherent in attempting to predict future consequences of a new
market entrant by a reasonable probability standard. Thus, the Court's
attempt to pass off the "engaged in commerce" requirement as a technical-
ity actually demonstrated a basic weakness in applying section 7 to new
business joint ventures.
The Supreme Court clearly chose applicability on the basis of what
they thought antitrust policy should be. The Court was fearful of allow-
ing a "joint venture loophole" and considered joint ventures a form of
"quasi merger. ' 35 In addition, it was the majority's view that joint ven-
tures should be subject to an incipiency standard as a matter of policy.
This concern for an incipiency standard relates to the Court's preoccupa-
tion with potential competition and does not provide a compelling policy
reason for applying section 7. Only three years after passage of the Sher-
man Act it was held that neither the letter of that law nor its purpose "dis-
tinguishes between strangling a commerce which has been born and pre-
venting the birth of a commerce which does not exist."'' 6 Furthermore, in
emphasizing protection of public interest under the Sherman Act, Judge
Learned Hand stated "it can make no difference whether an existing com-
petition is put an end to, or whether prospective competition is pre-
vented." 3 '
The Penn-Olin Court refused to become involved in exhaustive scru-
tiny of the original enactment, the 1950 amendment, or the legislative
history of either. Rather, the majority brushed under its judicial rug the
far reaching consequences of applicability of section 7 to new business
joint ventures, stating that "we are but expounding a national policy
enunciated by the Congress to preserve and promote a free competitive
economy.'' s This national policy was found in Congress' extension of
original section 7 to cover asset acquisitions of going concerns.
While Penn-Olin is not novel as an example of judicial legislation, it
does provide another example of the Supreme Court's proclivity to ex-
pand its influence beyond the traditional bounds of the checks and bal-
ances system. The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion were never able to attack successfully an asset acquisition prior to
the 1950 amendment and conceded inapplicability of original section 7."'3
In 1950, while strenuous efforts were being made to enact the Celler-
'a 378 U.S. at 168, citing United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 343 (1963);
cf. United Gas Improvement Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 381 U.S. 392 (1965).
' United States v. Patterson, 59 F. 280, 283 (C.C.D. Mass. 1893), endorsed by the Supreme
Court in United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32, 58 (1918).
""United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945). See also
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 150-53 (1948); United States v. Griffith,
334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948); United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324, 351, 369-71 (1912).
' 378 U.S. at 170. In further attempting to justify its judicial extension, the Supreme Court
mentioned the "grand design of the original § 7 ... to arrest incipient threats to competition
which the Sherman Act did not ordinarily reach .... " Id. at 170-71. In United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), the Court concluded that the purpose of the 1950
amendment was to broaden section 7 to cover "the entire range of corporate amalgamations." Id.
at 342.
... Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934); 33 O'. Arr'Y GEN.
225, 241 (1922); 1 F.T.C. 541-42 (1919).
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Kefauver amendment, the Department of Justice attempted to cure the
"assets loophole" before a district court that was sympathetic to its
goal." Nevertheless, the court accepted the proper balance between the
legislative and judicial branches and refused to amend section 7 by judi-
cial legislation.
Application of a provision in original section 7 which was not altered
by the 1950 amendment was urged in Penn-Olin. This paragraph (para-
graph 3) provides:
Nor shall anything contained in this section prevent a corporation engaged
in commerce from causing the formation of subsidiary corporations for the
actual carrying on of their immediate lawful business, or the natural and
legitimate branches or extensions thereof, or from owning and holding all or
a part of the stock of such subsidiary corporations, when the effect of such
formation is not to substantially lessen competition.14 1
The contention was made that Penn-Olin was a subsidiary of both Penn-
salt and Olin, and therefore entitled to consideration under this para-
graph. Although paragraph 3 has never been ruled on, the trial court
merely noted the contention and the Supreme Court ignored it. It is
most unfortunate that a careful analysis of paragraph 3 was not made,
as it provides an excellent avenue for reconciling joint ventures under
section 7. Penn-Olin was decided under the "may be" or "reasonable prob-
ability" standard while under paragraph 3, the Government would have
had to prove that the venture's effect was to lessen substantially compe-
tition. The effect of such a holding, in essence, would be a welcomed rec-
ognition that the Sherman Act standards were intended to test anticom-
petitive effects of new business. This conclusion would be sound, for al-
though the Clayton Act supplements the Sherman Act, it was designed
and intended to deal with corporate extinctions and the stifling of com-
petition by holding companies acquiring stock in existing corporations.
Moreover, the courts would be relieved of drawing many of the difficult
distinctions previously pointed out herein.
The Government contended that since paragraph 3 speaks of "a cor-
poration" causing subsidiaries to be formed, it cannot be applicable to a
situation where two or more corporations create a single subsidiary.' " It
was also contended that joint companies are not "subsidiaries" as used in
paragraph 3 and that congressional debates preceding passage of the
1914 enactment make it clear that the intent was to permit chain or
branch stores to be formed by a single parent corporation."
Since paragraph 3 does not provide an interpretation of what "a part
'
4 United States v. Celanese Corp. of America, 91 F. Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). "This Court
cannot amend Section 7 by judicial legislation . . . . The instrumentality to combat this evil
which the Government says is a threat to a well-balanced, free, competitive economy, must come
from Congress." Id. at 17.
14138 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. 5 18 (1964) (emphasis added).
""Post Trial Brief of the United States at 34, United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 217 F.
Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963).
43 Id. See also 51 CONG. REc. 9073, 14314-15 (1914). "The essence of subsidiary status
which distinguishes it from all other ownership interests in a corporation is single control by a
single parent." Post Trial Brief of the United States at 35, United States v. Penn-Olin Chem.
Co., 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963).
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of the stock" means, the Government set out its interpretation, which
could be of great importance for future joint venturers.
Section 7's main purpose was not to inhibit the normal processes of internal
growth by individual corporations, whether by creation of new plants, new
divisions or new wholly owned subsidiaries. The third paragraph, however,
speaks of the forming of subsidiaries by 'a corporation' which thereafter
holds 'all or a part of the stock.' To the extent that a part of the stock is
held by others (up to 49% of the total), questions of joint ownership and
external combination require an examination of competitive effects. In such
a case the statute imposes the burden on the controlling shareholder to show
that the creation's effect 'is not' to lessen competition substantially. Satis-
fying this test, i.e., of no present anticompetitive effect, would enable the
majority stockholder of a subsidiary to avert suit under the earlier paragraphs
of Section 7 in which its burden would otherwise be to refute a charge that
anticompetitive effects will probably occur in the future, i.e., where 'the
effect . . . may be substantially to lessen competition."44
Thus, it is the Government's position that as long as one venture parent
owns as much as fifty-one per cent of the stock, the venture will not be
tested under a reasonable probability standard."4
Not to go unnoticed is the Government's contention that the majority
stockholding parent would have the burden of proving that the venture
does not substantially lessen competition. While this is a matter of statu-
tory construction, it is submitted that once the majority stockholder es-
tablishes fifty-one per cent ownership, the burden should shift to the
Government to show substantial existing anticompetitive effects. This par-
agraph should be construed as an acknowledgment by Congress of the
necessity for and the benefits that can be derived from new internal or
joint growth, and not as a special restrictive exemption.
It is most improbable that in 1914 Congress intended to deal with so-
phisticated concepts of subsidiary, affiliate, or joint venture. The Govern-
ment can cite no references to congressional intent that fifty-one per cent
ownership be of special significance. Instead of second-guessing as to what
Congress meant by "subsidiary" in 1914, paragraph 3 should be con-
strued as a policy statement by Congress of its intent that new business
enterprises not be strangled in their inception by the Clayton Act.
The congressional purpose for enacting paragraph 2 of the Clayton
Act was to facilitate attacks against holding companies that were stran-
gling competition by acquiring stock in existing competitors."' One of
the purposes for enactment of paragraph 3 of the Clayton Act was to
permit establishment of chain or branch stores in subsidiary form which
by their very nature would be new competitive entities. But most sig-
nificantly, Congress did not limit paragraph 3 to chain or branch stores
144 Id. at 36.
145 The Government draws some support for this from the Pan American case, which, ironically,
supports the adequacy of the Sherman Act in coping with anticompetitive ventures. "Panagra
is not a subsidiary of Pan American; . . . If Pan American were the majority shareholder in Pana-
gra or if Panagra were a wholly owned subsidiary of Pan American it might make a decisive differ-
ence in this case." United States v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 18, 40 (S.D.N.Y.
1961)
146 Supra note 126.
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or ownership by a single parent corporation. It is submitted that Con-
gress intended that new competitive entities not be subject to the same
anticompetitive standards as paragraphs 1 and 2 which were designed to
deal with corporate extinctions and holding companies.
Congressional debate' in 1914 and a fair reading of the language of
section 7 indicate that Congress intended to make all stock acquisitions,
whether in established companies or new entities and whether complete
or partial, subject to a section 7 test. If the Clayton Act must be applied to
new business joint ventures, both antitrust policy goals and the Ameri-
can system of free enterprise will be better served by testing their com-
petitive effects under the subsidiary paragraph (paragraph 3) of section 7.
To do otherwise may all too often inhibit the creation of challenging new
competitors in a relevant market and thereby perpetuate and protect
existing competitors.
Future Trials and Tribulations. Prerequisite to measuring the competitive
effects of joint ventures will be ascertainment of the line or lines of
commerce and the section or sections of the country involved. The statutory
phrase "any line of commerce in any section of the country" divides the
relevant market into product and geographic categories, and modifies both
tests of illegality contained in section 7-substantial lessening of competi-
tion and tendency to create a monopoly. "' Both product and geographical
boundaries are generally measured with regard to "area of effective com-
petition,"""' and the Government has some burden of proof in these de-
terminations.
With respect to line of commerce or product market, a variety of
criteria must be dealt with. Ventures must now run the gauntlet between
the standard economic concept of cross-elasticity of demand' s° and the
concept of product submarkets within product markets.'"' When a ven-
ture's new product does not fit into a product market by conventional
economic standards, courts might look to inter-industry and potential
competition from other products and submarkets therein to measure com-
petitive effects.' With respect to relevant geographic markets, venture
products normally will be sold in areas of less than nationwide scope,
which can lead to extremely difficult problems of predictable delineation.
It is easy to state that the quest for a relevant geographic market is to be
'" S1 CONG. REc. 14468-72 (1914); see United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S.
321, 33 5-49 (1963).
"4Ss. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. at 8 (1950). These tests do not apply to pure
conglomerate joint ventures.
" The "area of effective competition in the known line of commerce must be charted by
careful selection of the market area in which the seller operates, and to which the purchaser can
practicably turn for supplies." Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961).
'"' In terms of a product market extending to the point where there is low interchangeability
between the product and substitute products. See Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325
(1962); cf. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393-404 (1956).
' Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962). Anticompetitive effects in a sub-
market can be fatal. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 277 (1964).
Among factors used to establish submarkets are: (a) industry or public recognition of submarket
as distinct from overall market for products, (b) peculiar characteristics and uses, (c) unique
production facilities, (d) distinct customers, vendors or prices, and (e) sensitivity to price changes.
'United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 452-58 (1964).
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approached in a pragmatic, factual manner rather than a formal, legalis-
tic one, and that it must " 'correspond to the commercial realities' of the
industry and be economically significant. 1. 3 It is quite another matter
to cope with geographic submarkets and different geographic markets at
different levels of distribution.'"
In short, geographic and product markets have not been refined to any
consistent principles for confident predictability. As stated by one com-
mentator:
Because of the relative flexibility with which the Court has dealt with the
problem of market boundaries, the term 'relevant market' for Clayton 7
purposes does not, and cannot refer to a 'market' in any single economic or
trade sense, but refers rather to a product-geographic locale where third
companies (competitors, suppliers, or customers) may be affected by an
acquisition--and nothing more."'
The task of counsel will be to anticipate all significant areas where par-
ticular competitors, suppliers, or customers may be affected by venture for-
mation before "star-gazing" can begin on the crucial question of pros-
pective probability of substantial lessening of competition. The following
general criteria for assessing the probability of a substantial lessening of
competition were given by the Supreme Court:
[T]he number and power of the competitors in the relevant market; the
background of their growth; the power of the joint venturers; the relation-
ship of their lines of commerce; the competition existing between them and
the power of each in dealing with the competitors of the other; the setting
in which the joint venture was created; the reasons and necessities for its
existence; the joint venture's line of commerce and the relationship thereof
to that of its parents; the adaptability of its line of commerce to non-
competitive practices; the potential power of the joint venture in the relevant
market; an appraisal of what the competition in the relevant market would
have been if one of the joint venturers had entered it alone . . . ; the effect,
in the event of this occurrence, of the other joint venturer's potential
competition; and such other factors as might indicate potential risk to
competition in the relevant market."'
These factors for testing under section 7 are in addition to specific intent
to eliminate competition and specific collateral restrictive agreements be-
tween venture parents.
' 
3 Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336-37 (1962).
14 Id. at 328, 336. As the Supreme Court stated in the Pabst case:
Certainly the failure of the Government to prove by an army of expert witnesses
what constitutes a relevant 'economic' or 'geographic' market is not an adequate
ground on which to dismiss a § 7 case. Compare United States v. Continental Can
Co., 378 U.S. 441, 458. Congress did not seem to be troubled about the exact spot
where competition might be lessened; it simply intended to outlaw mergers which
threatened competition in any or all parts of the country. Proof of the section of
the country where the anticompetitive effect exists is entirely subsidiary to the
crucial question in this and every § 7 case which is whether a merger may sub-
stantially lessen competition anywhere in the United States.
United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 549-50 (1966).
1m B. BocK, MARKETS AND MERGERS 59 (4th ed. 1965). Note the characterization of relevant
market in the dissent of Justice Fortas as "this strange red-haired, bearded, one eyed man-with-a-
limp classification." United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 591 (1966).
" 378 U.S. at 177. The new Merger Guidelines announced by the Department of Justice on




No indication is given regarding the relative importance of the cri-
teria, and it is apparent that many are shades and gradations of others.
It is clear, however, that the court is interested in probabilities and not
tangible present restraints. The underlying theme centers on foreclosure
of potential competition in the relevant market plus opportunities for
abuse in related markets.
In the traditional merger case, courts have relied heavily on respective
shares of the market of the acquired and acquiring companies, their com-
bined share, their respective rankings in the industry with regard to as-
sets and sales, and their combined rank with respect to remaining com-
petitors. If a new business venture is attacked in its incipiency, this in-
formation would not be available because competition is being created
where none existed before. Nevertheless, evidence of market rankings and
percentages of sales, production, and capacity of the venture's competitors
in the relevant market can be related to the necessity for venture forma-
tion. Since the venture does not combine anything previously existing, a
harder look at the number of acquisitions in the corporate growth patterns
of the parent corporations, including any previous antitrust violations,
can be expected.
Power of the parents and potential power of the venture in the rele-
vant market are closely related. Careful examination will be made of the
power of the parents through their creation to drive out small existing
competitors or to restrict further entry into the relevant market. This re-
lates to foreclosure of potential competition and barriers to market entry
as part of a relevant economic factors analysis. Lack of concentration
and a large number of competing units would indicate that entry bar-
riers are few, thus pointing to less justification for entry by joint partici-
pation, and vice versa. Joint ventures can be desirable, however, even in
non-concentrated markets. In oligopolistic markets, they should be en-
couraged as a method for reducing existing concentrations.
With respect to driving out existing competitors, inquiry will be made
into whether the financial resources of one or more of the parents are
such that the venture ultimately could dominate the market, i.e., provide
too much competition. In the leading case on anticompetitive "deep pock-
ets,' .... the Supreme Court upheld a Federal Trade Commission order re-
quiring Procter & Gamble to divest its wholly conglomerate acquisition
of Clorox. The Government attacked Procter & Gamble's position as the
largest advertiser in the United States and its ability to acquire advertising
discounts and shelf space not available to competitors. In addition, the
merger would have eliminated Procter & Gamble as a potential competitor
in the bleach business, which prior to the merger presumedly restrained
Clorox from exploiting its position of holding fifty per cent of the
market.
Other sources of "potential" power which may be urged are con-
trol of an inordinate share of vital raw materials and erosion of tradi-
" FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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tional industry structures through vertical integration, i.e., too much effi-
ciency through economies of scale. If an economic imbalance resulting
from parenthood is so great that venture competitors are unable to de-
fend themselves by innovation, increased commitments, etc., this should
be a very important factor.
The adaptability of the venture's line of commerce also is related closely
to the power of the parents. Opportunities for reciprocity may exist
based upon the proposition that the parents, by reason of their size, can
use their combined buying power as a basis for making reciprocal arrange-
ments with vendors who are also buyers of the venturer's product from
others, thus giving the venture an undue sales advantage.' A single par-
ent likewise could become the perpetrator of an illegal tying arrangement,
because of its control over the tying products (its substantial purchases),
to generate leverage over the tied product (the venture's product sought
to be sold)."'
There can be no doubt that reciprocal arrangements which ignore
price, quality, and service and substitute coercion in the form of direct
or implied threats of economic retribution are illegal.' But with joint
ventures attacked in their incipiency, courts do not have established recip-
rocal relationships with which to deal. Since section 7 does not require a
showing of certainty, a Government allegation that accumulation of pur-
chasing power by venture formation threatens substantially to lessen com-
petition presumedly would rest on the following intermediate proposi-
tions: (1) The venture probably will generate reciprocal purchasing power
for the parents; (2) such power, if generated, probably will be used; (3)
such power, if generated and used, probably will result in foreclosing com-
petition to a substantial share of the relevant market. Proof of these prop-
ositions should go well beyond establishing mere opportunities (possibil-
ity) for abuse. To do otherwise would be to ignore the statutory standard.
This quandary of establishing proper proof, similar to dealing with po-
tential lessening of potential competition, further demonstrates the clum-
siness of applying paragraph I of amended section 7 to joint ventures."'
s It is not overly speculative to assume that the judicious use of its steel-purchasing
power by Ingersoll-Rand could immeasurably increase the sales by the acquired
companies of machinery and equipment to the coal mining companies which acutely
need the continued goodwill of the steel industry. Moreover, the mere existence of
this purchasing power might make its conscious employment towards this end un-
necessary; the possession of the power is frequently sufficient, as sophisticated busi-
ness men are quick to see the advantages in securing the goodwill of the possessor.
United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530, 552 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 320 F.2d 509 (3d
Cir. 1963). See also Hale & Hale, Reciprocity Under the Antitrust Laws; A Comment, 113 U. PA.
L. REV. 69 (1964); Handler, supra note 17; Krash, The Legality of Reciprocity Under Section 7
of the Clayton Act, 9 ANTITRUST BULL. 93 (1964); Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7
of the Clayton Act, 78 HARv. L. REV. 1313, 1386-93 (1965).
"' FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); see Asper, Reciprocity, Purchasing Power and Competition, 48 MINN.
L. REV. 523, 539 (1964); Comment, Reciprocal Dealing and the Antitrust Laws, 77 HARv. L.
REV. 873 (1964).
"'FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); United States v. General Dynamics
Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530
(W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963); California Packing Corp., 25 F.T.C. 379 (1937);
Waugh Equip. Co., 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931).
... Like almost any other competitive power, purchasing power may be abused. When
it is, abuse should be corrected. But violations of law that must be postulated upon
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It is submitted that probabilities for reciprocity should be a minor con-
sideration with respect to the validity of a venture. In United States v.
General Tire &q Rubber Co.'5' the Government attacked reciprocity for the
first time in the absence of a merger or acquisition. While this case is of
utmost importance from the standpoint of possible stringent reciprocity
prohibitions in the future, it also demonstrates that restraints ancillary to
venture formation do not necessarily require venture dissolution. Certain-
ly, giving any significant weight to mere opportunity for abuse would be
as unconscionable as exalting possibility of foreclosure of potential com-
petition.
The relationship of the parents' lines of commerce, the competition ex-
isting between the parents, the power of each in dealing with compet-
itors of the other, and the venture's line of commerce in relation to the
parents' products are closely interrelated testing criteria. Essentially, courts
will be called upon to determine what probable effect participation in the
venture will have on future relations of the parents. It will be urged that
the closer the relationship of the parents' respective lines of commerce,
the more likely there will be horizontal and vertical foreclosures of com-
petition between the parents. If cooperation in the venture is a significant
part of the business of otherwise competing parents, the venture will be
attacked on the basis that such cooperation will lead to or dictate cooper-
ation in other areas. "3 While these results do not necessarily follow, fev-
erish "flag waving" by the Government can be expected.'" Courts will
again be mired in probability predictions where opportunities and possi-
bilities will not reach the statutory standard.
Examination of the setting in which the venture was created will re-
quire analysis of the market structure and negotiations and arrange-
ments between the parents prior to joint entry. Determinations will have
to be made as to whether the industry is oligopolistic with high entry
barriers or whether small businesses might be endangered by joint entry.
Any pre-incorporation agreements between the parents relating to mar-
keting arrangements, territorial plans, or product pricing will be care-
fully scrutinized for Sherman Act violations.
The reasons and necessities for venture formation will be critical for
the survival of the offspring. A demonstration of increase in actual com-
petition should not be relied on as showing sufficient justification. In ad-
dition, the parents should be prepared to give convincing evidence of
purposes such as sharing financial burdens which a single parent would
not or could not undertake, assuring a source of supply of critical raw
materials, utilizing complementary technology and research facilities, or
'probabilities' are hard enough to handle. If we add violations built upon 'opportuni-
ities for abuse' and 'probabilities of opportunity for abuse,' two results followi It is
increasingly difficult for one to know what he must do to comply with the law,
and the power of enforcement agencies to rearrange rather than merely to correct
is 'probably' greatly enlarged.
Asper, supra note 159, at 555.1 6 2 Civil No. 67-155 (N.D. Ohio, filed March 2, 1967).
16 United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 963 (D. Mass. 1950);
Comment, supra note 17, at 108.
64 See justice Douglas' dissent, 378 U.S. at 177.
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achieving economies of scale necessary to compete in the relevant market
larger than the capacity of either individual parent. All studies and sur-
veys relating to the need for joint formation should be carefully docu-
mented and preserved.'
It is apparent that this array of criteria, along with others previously
discussed, will require careful and proper planning from origination
through implementation. As soon as possible, the venture should become
and be conducted as a separate entity having its own staff of employees
and management personnel. Parents should avoid any behavior which
could be interpreted as an agreement to avoid competition between each
other and preferably with the venture. Ideally, the parents should treat
the venture as a stock purchase investment with future negotiations con-
ducted at arm's length.'
It is evident that these guidelines require examination of all possible
anticompetitive effects resulting from venture formation with special em-
phasis on foreclosures between the parents, the parents and the venture,
and the customers and suppliers of the parents. These factors should be
tested, but the significance of the guidelines is in what is omitted, i.e., the
effect of increase in actual competition. The fact that joint ventures pro-
vide a new competitive force requiring some alteration of the controlling
criteria in merger cases was acknowledged by the Supreme Court in
Penn-Olin, but no perceptible degree of its importance can be surmised.
Increase in actual competition in a realistically structured relevant mar-
ket should head the list of importance and be balanced against properly
proven foreclosures. The overriding public interest should be directed
toward improvement of competition and preservation of business experi-
mentation. Only when the Government can demonstrate that a different
set of circumstances probably would have produced a greater increase in
competition should it prevail under section 7. Even when a venture is un-
successful and does not measurably increase competition, it should not
be condemned unless a substantial lessening is proven as a matter of rea-
sonable probability. In keeping with the substantial lessening standard,
the underlying philosophy should be to insure that actual and prospective
competition in the relevant market have not been impaired substantially,
and that related markets basically are unaffected. An unsuccessful ven-
ture may indicate that a larger, more efficient combination of resources
is necessary to crack an existing market. In short, if section 7 must be
165 If merger rationale is extended to joint ventures in this area, parents should not. expect
a warm reception for their business justifications. Defenses based upon increased efficiency and
economies of scale were rejected in American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 813
(1946); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945); United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 345 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curials, 347
-U.S. 521 (1954). Attempts to justify mergers on the grounds that expansion was necessary to
satisfy market demand in a new area, see United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp.
576, 615-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), and that consolidation was necessary to effectively challenge a
market leader, see American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387,
399 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958), also have not prevailed. See Comment,
"Substantially To Lessen Competition ... ":.Current Problems of Horizontal Mergers, 68 YALE
L.J. 1627, 1654-62 (1959).
166 For discussion of drafting problems, see generally Note, Joint Venture Corporations: Draft-
ing the Corporate Papers, 78 HARv. L. Ri7v. 393 (1964).
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applied in new business joint venture cases, the emphasis should be on
increases in competition rather than the traditional merger approach of
seeking out foreclosures resulting from corporate extinctions.
A rare possibility is that a particular venture was formed merely to
avoid competition among the parents. It has been demonstrated herein that
the Sherman Act is more than adequate in dealing with such a situation.
It is submitted, moreover, that the overriding policy objective should be
to stimulate the economy with actual competition by some new entry. The
fact that amended section 7 is not designed to cope with incipient threats
posed by new entrants should in no way lighten the Government's task.
Having chosen its method of assault, the Government should not complain
about the obvious difficulties which will be encountered. The built-in in-
adequacies of attempting to prove incipient foreclosure by a new entity
strongly points to the lack of desirability of section 7 application as con-
strued by the Supreme Court. The American economy can ill afford this
inventive threat to future growth and experimentation.
V. CONCLUSION
In essence, Penn-Olin is but another example of the current dominance
of reactionary antitrust enforcement policies. The philosophy of the De-
partment of Justice and the Supreme Court as expressed in the major
antitrust cases beginning with Brown Shoe ' results in maintaining arbi-
trary market structures for the allocation of resources by unduly inhibit-
ing the scope of freedom of contract. The approach centers on such as-
sumptions as (1) the degree of competition is directly proportionate to
the number of competitors, (2) short-run effects on competition alone
are important, (3) injury to individual competitors equals injury to com-
petition, (4) a firm's size measures its economic power to lessen competi-
tion, (5) market share measures a firm's market power, and (6) the de-
gree of concentration in an industry determines competitiveness.'" These
assumptions are but finely honed embellishments of Judge Learned Hand's
famous exposition of one view of the social purpose of the antitrust laws:
"[I]t is possible, because of its indirect social or moral effect, to prefer a
system of small producers, each dependent for his success upon his own
skill and character, to one in which the great mass of those engaged must
accept direction of a few.""' Assuming merit to this sophistry if we lived
in a stagnant, never changing world, today's technological revolution cer-
tainly has taught us that clinging to old business methods will lead to
the ultimate disintegration of the non-innovator.""0
167 Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
1 For an excellent discussion puncturing some common economic assumptions prevalent in
today's antitrust enforcement policy, see, Dean & Gustus, supra note 119.
""United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
175 "Hand's rhetoric has commended itself to most commentators on the topic, but it seems
clear upon reflection that it is a position which is questionable as a description of congressional
intent, dubious as social policy, and impossible of antitrust doctrine." Bork & Bowman, The Crisis
hs Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 369 (1965). This article is the first in a sequence of five
which fully explore the conflicting views currently being advocated on antitrust policy. The others
are: Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 377 (1965); Bork, Contrasts in
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JOINT VENTURES
The struggle in antitrust law today is essentially a conflict between the
social value of encouraging economic progress via business experimenta-
tion and the existence of an anti-efficiency backlash through fear of big-
ness. Courts and enforcement agencies have blurred any meaningful dis-
tinction between truly destructive per se type anticompetitive practices-
the necessary and proper concern of antitrust policy-and competitive
advantages and opportunities gained through superior skill, foresight, and
willingness to innovate whether by combination or otherwise.
We are clearly in another era of attacking market structures as such,
analogous to the anti-bigness campaigns of the early 1900's. But today's
industrial framework and our underlying economy are totally different
from this bygone era. A large contemporary corporation is characterized
more and more by a wide dispersal of responsibility and decision-making
authority within management. There is typically a strong intra-corporate
as well as inter-corporate competition between sales territories, districts,
and divisions for increased sales, lower costs, and greater profit margins on
the same and dissimilar products. Middle and lower management personnel
are responsible for their subordinates and ultimately report to the chief
executive officer, but are not directed like drones by a corporate monarch.
Thousands of corporate executives on varying levels within large modern
companies have more opportunities to initiate and make decisions than
the small shopkeepers, farmers, and tradesmen had at the turn of the cen-
tury. Increase in the size of business enterprises has not concentrated busi-
ness power into the hands of a few, stifled initiative, or encouraged ineffi-
ciency.' Staffing joint ventures with separate management should remove
initially any stigma of the venture being a mere directed instrumentality
of the parents.
Closely related to this emergence of professional management is the
highly significant rise in consumer purchasing power with discretionary
income. Management must constantly anticipate marketing trends, seek
to provide better quality products or services, and initiate or be ready
to combat the "better mousetrap." Demands for efficiency are endless, but
efficiency alone is no saviour in this era of continuous and rapid scientific
breakthroughs.
Particularly in the area of joint ventures, effective antitrust policy
should forego tying archaic economic concepts to indefinite and unpre-
dictable legal standards and acknowledge that tomorrow's technology
will neutralize or overwhelm today's competitive gains.Y It also is essen-
Antitrust Theory: 1, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 401 (1965); Bowman, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory:
Ii, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 417 (1965); Blake & Jones, Toward a Three Dimensional Antitrust Policy,
65 COLUM. L. REv. 422 (1965). See also Bock, The Relativity of Economic Evidence in Merger
Cases-Emerging Decisions Force the Issue, 63 MIcH. L. REV. 1355 (1965).
"71 Handler, Some Unresolved Problems of Antitrust, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 930, 951-55 (1962).
See Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 541 (1933).
7'2 "We have three choices: We can substitute planning for the competitive market; we can
keep the market, while distorting its action by government intervention on the false premise that
the vigor of competition is determined by the number and size of competitors; or we can recognize
that we are moving, year by year, into a more truly competitive and more innovative society in
which we will not need and cannot afford the restrictive side of antitrust." Ways, Antitrust in An
Era of Radical Change, FoRTUNE MAGAZINE, March 1966, at 225.
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tial in shaping antitrust policy for joint ventures to recognize that they
may have the immediate effect of promoting competition even where
very large companies are involved. The previously stated economic ad-
vantages of venture formation should be accepted as promoting the cre-
ation of new technologies and industries in a manner superior to no amal-
gamation in many cases. Ventures such as Penn-Olin, which are not based
on technological progress, also should be encouraged when overall increases
in actual competition result. Where a new product, new service, or new
production or merchandising method is introduced, a positive, rather than
restrictive, approach to joint ventures will result inevitably in overall
substantial benefits for consumers and the entire economy.
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